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The security and safety of the drinking water distribution system has recently generated 
concern. Accidental and intentional contamination by chemical, biological and radiological 
contaminants could cause major consequences for the consumer because clean water is critical to 
the nation’s infrastructure. An attack on the water supply could disable an entire city. Therefore, 
it is necessary to develop a system to monitor the water quality to ensure the water is safe for 
consumption.  
In an attempt to protect the water systems, Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority 
(PWSA) initiated research to test the various instruments within a Contaminant Warning System 
(CWS). The system measures water quality and triggers an alarm for deviation in the quality. 
The different methods of detection utilized in the study include turbidity, chlorine, pH, 
conductivity, TOC, Online gas chromatography-mass spectrometry, ultra violet transmittance, 
biomonitor, and a pathogen identification system. 
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The contaminants were pumped into the pilot distribution system CWS, and the 
responses of a variety of online monitors were evaluated. The contaminants range from 
fluorosilicic acid, which is used to increase the fluoride concentration of water, to a 
nonpathogenic species of Bacillus, which could serve as a model for Bacillus anthracis, the 
bacterial species that causes the disease anthrax. The system was connected to main transmission 
lines that feed downtown Pittsburgh with drinking water. While many of the monitors detected 
one or more contaminants, at least one of the devices used in the pilot distribution system CWS 
responded all of the contaminants. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been an increased concern in 
the security of the drinking water infrastructure. As a result, the water industry and federal 
government have begun to demonstrate the development of a Contamination Warning System 
(CWS), in an effort to detect the sudden appearance of contaminants in public water supplies.  In 
fact, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) directed USEPA, the lead agency for 
protection of drinking water and wastewater utilities, to “develop robust, comprehensive, and 
fully coordinated surveillance and monitoring systems…that provide early detection and 
awareness of disease, pest or poisonous agents” (Bush, 2004). The goal of the directive is to 
develop monitoring systems that not only enhance security against manmade events, but protect 
against ‘All Hazards’ by warning utilities of accidental contamination that may occur as a result 
of industrial spills into the source water, as well as from cross connections, back siphonages, and 
water main breaks that occur in the finished water distribution system.  Additionally, it is hoped 
that multiple benefits can be derived from the deployment of online monitoring equipment that 
may provide useful information for utility regulatory compliance and process control. 
The Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority (PWSA) provides drinking water treatment 
and distribution for the City of Pittsburgh and several surrounding municipalities.  Average daily 
production of drinking water is approximately 75 mgd, with seasonal peaks of 100 mgd. 
Following the events of 9-11 Pittsburgh, like a number of other American cities, has been 
investing resources into increasing their online surveillance of water quality throughout the 
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finished water distribution system. The research reported herein was completed in cooperation 
with PWSA. Research was carried out to install and test a pilot contamination monitoring system 
located on a primary water distribution main going to downtown Pittsburgh. 
This overall objective of installing, operating, evaluating  and challenge testing a drinking 
water contaminant warning system can be divided into the following specific objectives: 
  Observe changes in water quality parameters in response to an accidental or intentional 
contamination event; 
 Analyze the detection of a contamination event by the contamination warning system 
instruments; 
 Distinguish  the difference from a true contamination event and normal back ground 
variation; and 
 Scrutinize the usefulness, accuracy, and detection capabilities of the instruments in the 
pilot online monitoring system. 
 Provide guidance to the water industry on the usefulness and accuracy of contaminant 
warning systems and their application in contaminant event detection. 
 
The pilot CWS is located and connected to a water distribution main upstream of 
downtown Pittsburgh. The intention of the CWS is to identify contamination before the 
downtown population is affected.  To monitor the water quality, a variety of equipment was used 
in the CWS including: 
 Hach Distribution Panel and Event Sensor; 
 Sievers TOC Analyzer; 
 INFICON Online GC-MS; 
 JMAR Biosentry Pathogen Identification System;  
 Biosensor Fish Monitor; and 
 Real Tech UVT 254 Online Monitor. 
All the instruments continuously monitor the water quality. Changes in one or more 
monitored parameters could indicate a possible contamination. Once detected, the alarm should 
be evaluated and the appropriate action taken before the consumers are adversely affected. To 
test the system, select toxins related to accidental and intentional contamination were introduced 
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into the pilot system. The contaminants range from fluorosilicic acid, used to increase the 
fluoride concentration of water, to a nonpathogenic Bacillus species that serves as a model for 
the pathogenic Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium that causes anthrax. The next section discusses 
the background and literature associated with this research project. 
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2.0  BACKGROUND 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 made it apparent that national infrastructure might 
be vulnerable to an attack. Water is a resource that affects every facet of life because it is not 
only used for drinking but also cooking, bathing, public health (hospitals), firefighting, and 
sanitation. The absence of clean water would negatively affect the economy. An attack on the 
water supply, downstream of a major treatment plant, could go undetected until individuals 
become ill and doctors/hospitals report cases. In the case of pathogens, days could pass before 
people become seriously ill. The potential to cause mass causalities is highly probable and 
detection needs to be available to protect against these events.  An attack on a single 
metropolitan water supply would cause terror and national skepticism in water safety.  
Accidental contamination is also a concern for the water sector. The possibilities of 
breakthrough of the filters or overdosing of treatment chemicals are events that could go 
unnoticed. The events although not deliberate could still cause widespread illness.  Fire hydrants 
are of particular concern for intentional contamination. There are typically hundreds or 
thousands of hydrants within a municipality. A pump or pump truck large enough to overcome 
the hydrant pressure could be used to inject contaminants into the water supply. 
Continuous monitoring of water within the distribution system could provide a rapid 
detection of changes in water quality. Quick detection could decrease cases of illnesses or even 
death. The distribution system is especially vulnerable due to the large geographic area and ease 
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of accessibility [Byer & Carlson, 2005]. The overall goal of the water sector is to provide clean 
water for the nation’s population.  
2.1 INTENTIONAL CONTAMINATION EVENTS 
The possibility of a contamination event is real. Actions that would disrupt the system include 
[Bitton, 2005]: 
 Physical destruction 
 Chemical contamination  
 Cyber attack 
 Bioterrorist attack 
Disruptions of the water supply by destroying treatment equipment would be an act of 
physical destruction. Chemical contamination would be done by deliberately injecting chemicals 
into the distribution system. Today, computers control many of the processes at the water 
treatment plant. A cyber attack could be done by a hacker disrupting the water operation via 
computer access. Lastly, a bioterrorist attack would be injection of microbes with the intent to 
cause harm to the consuming population. For this research, chemical and biological 
contamination will be the focus.  
Contaminants can infect humans by adsorption through the skin, ingestion and inhalation. 
To have the greatest impact on a population, the ideal contaminants would have characteristic of 
[States, 2008]: 
 Low infectious or toxic dose  
 Chlorine resistant 
 Stable in water 
 Easily obtained 
 Difficult for consumers to detect in water by appearance, odor, or taste 
 Produces severe disease or results in death 
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 Although a terrorist event affecting water supplies has not occurred within the US, 
vandals and disgruntled workers have caused problem for water utilities. Below is a summary of 
some accidental and intentional contamination events that have occur within the last 15 years.  
2.1.1 Milwaukee, 1993 
The largest outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurred in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It was caused by a 
combination of natural event and water treatment failure. The incident affected 403,000 residents 
with 4,400 people being hospitalize and 54 deaths. 
2.1.2 Kosovo, 1998 
In Kosovo, wells were poisoned with animal carcasses and hazardous material like paint, oil and 
gasoline by Yougoslav federal forces, or their allies. Seventy percent of the wells were 
contaminated.  The events caused people to become ill and prevented the use of well water for an 
extensive period [Washington Post, 1998].  
2.1.3 Ohio, June 2001 
In Canton, Ohio, a former water department employee poisoned a pair of wells with organic 
trichloroethylene. Residents were warned not to drink, bathe or wash clothes for six days until 
home wells were inspected and cleared. “Preliminary samples showed levels of tetrachloroethane 
and trichloroethylene at 1,600 parts per billion, or about 400 times the safe limit set for drinking 
water by the Environmental Protection Agency” [Nation in Brief, 2001]. 
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2.1.4 California, November 2001 
In Portola, CA two locks to the city’s one million gallon water storage tank were discovered 
missing. The city ordered a ‘do not use’ to thousands of consumers that rely on that water. The 
water was tested but no contamination was detected [Groover, 2005].  
2.1.5 Rome, February 2002 
The Italian police confiscated cyanide and maps of the city from four Moroccans. The arrested 
men were carrying 9 pounds of potassium ferricyanide and maps pinpointing the embassy and of 
the water distribution system of the city. The embassy was the suspected location for the attack 
[USA Today, 2002].  
2.1.6 Iowa, May 2002 
Juveniles were suspected in a case of vandalism at the water pumping station in Dawson, Iowa. 
Officials found chemicals splattered inside the building, and damaged computers. 
2.1.7 Wisconsin, June 2002 
In Janesville, WI, the barbed wire perimeter fence to a five million gallon storage tank 
was cut and the pad lock removed. The water department drained the tank and it was super 
chlorinated as a precaution. No evidence of contamination was found but the city added $150K 
in security improvements [Groover, 2005].  
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2.1.8 Florida, January 2003 
 In Debary, FL, the lock on the entry gate was broken and screens removed from the aerators. 
Introduction of a contaminant could have affected the water in more than 4,000 homes, but no 
contaminants were found. The officials suspect that the break in was a “professional job” beyond 
vandalism [Groover, 2005].  
2.1.9 Jordan, April 2003 
Iraqi agents were arrested before they executed their plotted plan to poison a water tank in Khao, 
Jordan. The tank supplied water to American Troops [New York Times, 2003].  
2.1.10 Greenville, October 2003 
In Greenville, South Carolina, the city’s water supply was threatened with ricin poisoning unless 
demands were meet.  The attacker wanted changes made in federal regulation pertaining to the 
number of hours that overland truckers were allowed to drive without rest. A vial of highly 
concentrated ricin was found in the local post office, but subsequent tests found no ricin in the 
water system [Greenville News, 2003]. 
2.1.11 China, 2003 
In Henan Province, approximately 500 ml of pesticide was dumped into the city’s reservoir that 
serves 9,000 homes. The act was carried out by a water purification device salesman in an effort 
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to promote sales. There were no deaths reported but 64 people became ill and 42 of them were 
hospitalized [BBC, 2003]. 
2.1.12 Pakistan, 2008 
Five Sunni militants were arrested in a planned attempt to poison a water supply with cyanide 
powder. The target was the water distributed during a Shiite Muslim festival of Ashura in 
Karachi. Police recovered 500 grams of cyanide and concluded that the aim was to cause mass 
causalities [Wall Street Journal, 2008].  
 
2.2 WATER CONTAMINATION INFORMATION TOOL (WCIT) 
Introduced in late 2005, the online database provides information about chemical, biological and 
radiological contaminants of security concern. The password-protected database contains 
information on 93 different contaminants that are of concern to drinking water and wastewater. 
Unlike, other datasheets, WCIT provides water specific data about the contaminants.  The United 
States Environmental Protections Agency (USEPA) operates the website.  The site provides 
quick access to vital information about regulated and non-regulated contaminants.  
Each contaminant is divided into a category defining the type of contaminant. The 
categories include organic, inorganic, biotoxin, pathogen, chemical warfare agent, radioisotope 
and radiochemical.  
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Each contaminant in WCIT includes information about [USEPA, 2007]:  
 Name, chemical abstract service (CAS) ID; 
 Physical or pathogen properties; 
 Availability; 
 Fate and transport; 
 Medical and toxicity information; 
 Field and laboratory methods; 
 Drinking water and wastewater treatment; 
 Environmental impacts; and 
 Infrastructure decontamination. 
Physical properties include information about solubility, vapor pressure, density, and 
Henry’s law coefficient for each contaminant. For biological contaminants, size, shape and 
motility information is provided for the infective, reproductive, and resistant stages.  The ease in 
which to obtain the substance, either by purchasing, harvesting or synthesizing is delineated in 
availability.  Information about chlorine reactivity, adsorption, stability and reactivity in water, 
thermal inactivation, and half-life is found in the fate and transport. Under medical and toxicity, 
basic facts about adsorption, inhalation, and ingestion exposure are provided along with the 
lethal dose for 50 percent of a test population dies (LD50). WCIT also, provides information on 
the effectiveness of drinking water and wastewater treatment processes in removing or 
inactivating a particular contaminant. For drinking water, alum coagulation, reverse osmosis, 
lime softening, carbon adsorption, and advance oxidation processes are evaluated for each 
contaminant. Activated carbon and multiple other disinfection possibilities are outlined for their 
effectiveness in removing the toxin. The section on infrastructure decontamination outlines the 
steps that should be taken if the contamination event were to occur.  
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The database is password protected and access is limited. Organizations that are eligible 
include [USEPA, 2007]: 
 Drinking water and wastewater utilities; 
 State drinking water primary agencies; 
 Drinking water and wastewater associations partnering with EPA; 
 State and local public health officials; 
 Federal officials ; and 
 State laboratories 
 
2.3 RESPONSE TO A CONTAMINATION EVENT 
Should an accidental or intentional contamination event occur, an emergency response plan is 
needed with clear concise steps. The EPA has developed the Response Protocol Toolbox, which 
outlines the steps to take during drinking water contamination event [USEPA, 2003]. The 
methods and steps do not guarantee that the contaminant will be identified, but a quick and safe 
evaluation of the water.  
2.3.1 Site Characterization 
EPA recommends that a field safety screening be conducted on a suspected site before the 
response team proceeds with testing and sampling [USEPA, 2003]. The three objectives of field-
testing the water are to assess the credibility of the threat, to identify the possible contaminant 
and to determine if special precautions are needed during testing and sampling. The preliminary 
and presumptive contaminants will be justified by additional laboratory tests. For an assessment 
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of the level of threat, basic information about the water is needed. Therefore, tests need to be 
conducted on the water in question. 
The first recommended step in a field safety screening is to examine the site for 
radiological hazards. Radiation detectors are an established technology. They are quick, easy to 
use and are capable of analyzing for alpha, beta and gamma radiation. In addition to ruling out a 
possible radiation contamination, the test is a safety screening for the response team. If radiation 
is detected, special personal protective equipment is needed for additional testing and sampling.  
To proceed with further tests, baseline information about the water is necessary.  Average 
distribution values for basic water quality are a valuable resource in interpreting results of 
general water quality. To ensure proper results, TOC, chlorine residual, or conductivity, among 
others, need to be compared against baseline values to determine if deviations have occurred. 
Parameters to consider for routine monitoring include: 
 pH 
 Conductivity 
 TOC 
 Chlorine/chloramines residual 
 Total organic carbon (TOC) 
 UV absorbance 
With the exception of chlorine, the other parameters typically remain relatively stable 
throughout the distribution system [USEPA, 2003]. Although there will be slight variations of 
these due to changes in finished water quality. Chlorine concentration usually fluctuates with 
time and location and is a function factors such as of temperature, water usage, and distribution 
system residence time. Within many systems, there are also disinfectant booster stations to 
maintain the chlorine residual.  
2.3.2 Rapid Analytical Field Testing 
Once the site has been cleared, testing and sampling can begin. The flow chart for the field tests 
that need to be performed can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow Chart for Field Testing 
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2.3.2.1 Chemical Detection 
Rapid testing of water should be done in a short amount of time at the site. “The 
underlying goal of rapid field testing is to produce results rapidly and accurately enough to help 
response officials make timely evaluations of the credibility of a threat, and initiate response 
actions that would reduce the impact of the contaminant and help protect the public, utility 
workers, infrastructure and private property, and the environment” [States, 2008].  During rapid 
testing, bacteria and chemical water quality should be evaluated along with toxicity. Chemical 
water quality analysis should include conductivity, pH, alkalinity, hardness, turbidity, TOC, UV 
absorbance, and chlorine demand.  
Cyanide analysis is a quick field test and is recommended because it “has been one of the 
most commonly threatened intentional contaminants for drinking water” [States, 2008]. The 
technology for cyanide detection is based on either colorimetric or ion selective electrodes.  
Chlorine is easily measured using colorimetric testing. In addition, ion selective electrodes are 
established technologies for conductivity and pH monitoring.  
The field deployable GC-MS detected for volatile hydrocarbons in water, soil, and air 
samples. The INFICON HAPSITE GC-MS utilizes a purge and trap system to collect samples 
for analysis.  The system can identify and quantify the organic contaminant in the sample. 
Detection is in the range of low ppb and can detect compounds with molecular weight ranging 
from 45 to 300 grams per mole. Until laboratory analysis is conducted, the field GC-MS can 
analyze samples quickly.  
The rapid enzyme test is used to identify pesticides and nerve agents in water samples.  
Inhibition of the enzyme cholinesterase provides a qualitative detection of toxins. For one 
minute, saturated cholinesterase membrane disk are exposed to the water sample. Next, the disk 
is attached to another disk containing ester for three minutes. A blue color is a negative result for 
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pesticide or nerve agents because cholinesterase hydrolyzes the bonded ester. Detections occurs 
when the cholinesterase is inhibited by the contaminant and the result is no color change.  
 
2.3.2.2 Acute Toxicity 
Broad-spectrum screening tests are used to measure for toxicity, where toxic substances 
include industrial chemicals, chemical weapons, and biotoxins. Three commercially available 
technologies include: 
 Microtox 
 Eclox 
 IQ Toxicity Test 
Microtox or Deltatox, the field version, is a broad-spectrum assay that follows Standard 
Methods 8050. Acute toxicity is determined by inhibition of bacterial bioluminescence. The test 
uses Vibrio fischer, a naturally luminescent marine bacteria, as test organisms.  
Approximately one million bacteria are mixed into a water sample. At exposure duration 
of 5, 15, 30 minutes the resulting light from the bacteria is measured with a photometer. Positive 
toxic contamination should result in decease of bioluminescence compared to the negative 
control.  
Eclox is a rapid chemiluminescence assay that utilizes plant enzymes combined with 
reagents to produce light. The amount of light is an indication of possible toxic substances in the 
water sample. The presence of toxins in the sample reduces the amount of luminescence by 
interfering with the reaction. The result is compared to negative control of distilled water. The 
samples are mixed with chemical luminal, a reaction enhancer, an oxidant, and the plant enzyme 
horseradish peroxidase.  
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IQ Toxicity Test utilizes the aquatic invertebrate Daphnia magna as an acute toxicity 
assay. In a series of 10 ml exposure compartments, six Daphnia are placed in each cavity and 
exposed for one hour. Some of the chambers contain contaminated water while others negative 
controls. After one-hour fluorogenically tagged sugar is added to the samples. Healthy Daphnia 
will metabolize the sugar (galactose) and release the tagged maker through the organism’s 
circulatory system.   The number of healthy organisms in the control chamber is compared to 
those in the sample water.  Daphnia will not be illuminated when adversely affected by the water 
sample.  
Toxicity screening test are just indicators for possible contamination. The tests are a 
broad-spectrum analysis that can detect toxicity for a wide range of contaminants. The exact 
contaminant cannot be determined from this detection method.  
2.3.2.3 Rapid Immunoassay 
The immunochromatographic assay is a qualitatively identification system. The test is 
able to detect chemical or biological agents by using antigen-antibody binding to form an 
indication color. For biological contamination, the test strips rely on antibodies targeting protein 
that are unique to that agent. Positive or negative results can visually be read by a color indicator. 
Electronic readers are available to enhance detection reading. The strips to indicate a possible 
contaminant but they are susceptible to false positives. For an electronic reader the contaminants 
and detection limits are [States, 2008]: 
 Bacillus anthracis (1x105 cfu/mL) 
 Yersinia pestis (2x105 cfu/mL) 
 Francisella tularensis (1.4x105 cfu/mL) 
 Botulinum toxin (10 μg/L) 
 Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B (SEB) (2.5 μg/L) 
 Ricin (50 μg/L) 
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Table 1 summarizes the tests that can be conducted, contaminants detected by each test, 
the difficulty performing the analysis and the time each test takes.  
 
 
Table 1. Summary of Rapid Analytical Techniques [States, 2008] 
Test/Assay Contaminants Detected 
Difficulty in 
Performing 
Analysis 
Time (minutes) 
Pathogens: 
Anthrax, Plague, 
Cholera 
Biotoxins: 
Rapid 
Immunoassays 
Botulinum, Ricin, 
SEB 
Simple 15 
Insecticides: 
Organophosates, 
Carbamates, 
Thiophospates 
Rapid Enzyme 
Test 
Nerve Agents 
Simple 5 
Pathogens: 
Anthrax, Plague, 
Campylobacter,        
E coli 0157, 
Salmonella, 
Cryptosporidium 
Biotoxins: 
Rapid PCR 
Botulinum, Ricin 
Moderately 
Difficult 90 
Field Deployable 
GC or GC/MS VOCs Most Difficult 60 
Acute Toxicity 
Screening Methods 
Industial Chemicals, 
Weaponized 
Chemicals, Biotoxins 
Simple to 
Moderately 
Difficult 
Eclox - 5   
Microtox - 45   
IQ Toxicity - 90 
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The methods are tools for quick analysis of water during a possible contamination event. 
Additional testing is needed to confirm the field test. A quick examination of the water is needed 
for response and public health decisions. Additional information about commercially available 
detection technologies can be found in the EPA Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) 
program. 
2.4 PREVIOUS STUDIES 
There have been a few studies carried out related to CWS but the proposal to continuously 
monitor water for security reason is relatively new and not many works have been published. A 
few of the studies include a pilot system in Cincinnati, Ohio, and collaboration between the US 
Air Force and Colorado State University.  Both of the pilot systems measured changes in water 
quality. Alternatively, the York City Department of Environmental Protection and the US Army 
conducted separate research on biomonitors utilizing fish. The research examined the changes in 
the behaviors of the fish related to possible contamination event.   
2.4.1 Cincinnati, Ohio 
A pilot study was completed in Cincinnati, Ohio at the Water Awareness Technology Evaluation 
Research and Security Laboratory within the USEPA Test and Evaluation Facility (T&E 
Facility) [Hall & et al, 2007]. The purpose of the research was to measure the changes in water 
quality parameters to indicate possible contamination.  
To simulate a drinking water distribution system, the study used a recirculation pipe-loop 
distribution system simulator (DSS) which included 75 feet of pipe. The piping used was six-
 19 
inch diameter unlined cast-iron pipe and the looping piping system had a capacity of 150 gallons.  
Chlorine was added to the system to establish a baseline around 1mg/L. Potable water was added 
to the system at a rate of 0.16 gpm therefore the pilot takes 24 hours for the original water to be 
completely replaced.  The DSS operated at a flow rate of 88 gpm.  
Online chemical sensors were positioned 70 feet from the contaminant injection point. 
These monitors measured free chlorine, total chlorine, turbidity, pH, specific conductance, total 
organic carbon (TOC), dissolved oxygen (DO), oxygen reducing potential (ORP), temperature, 
ammonia, and nitrates.  To test the sensors, contaminants were injected into the DSS. The 
contaminants used were: nonchlorinated secondary effluent from the local wastewater treatment 
plant, potassium ferricyanide, pesticide containing malathion, herbicide containing glyphosate, 
arsenic trioxide, nicotine, aldicarb and Escherichia coli K-12. From a tracer study, the time for 
the contaminant to reach the sensors 70 feet away was found to be 75 seconds.  The results of the 
research can be seen in Table 2, which shows the differences from the baseline the different 
sensors for each contaminant injected. For the Cincinnati DSS biological sensors were not used 
because chlorine, which is present in distribution systems, is toxic to aquatic life.    
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Table 2. Sensor Response Following Introduction of Contaminant [Hall & et al, 2007] 
 Sensor Response 
Contaminant Increase from Baseline Decrease from Baseline 
Wastewater Chloride Free Chlorine 
 Specific conductance ORP 
 Turbidity  
 TOC  
Potassium ferricyanide Free chlorine  
 TOC  
 Chloride  
 Nitrate-nitrogen  
 Ammonia-nitrogen  
 ORP  
Glyphosate formation TOC Free Chlorine 
 Chloride ORP 
Malathion formation TOC Free Chlorine 
 Turbidity  ORP 
Aldicarb TOC Total chlorine 
 Turbidity Free chlorine 
  ORP 
TOC Total chlorine 
Ammonia-nitrogen Free chlorine 
Escherichia coli in ‘Terrific 
Broth’ 
Turbidity  
‘Terrific Broth’ Turbidity Total chlorine 
 TOC Free chlorine 
  ORP 
Arsenic trioxide Turbidity Total chlorine 
 Ammonia-nitrogen Free chlorine 
  Nitrate-nitrogen 
  ORP 
Nicotine TOC Free chlorine 
 Ammonia-nitrogen Nitrate-nitrogen 
 Chloride  ORP 
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2.4.2 US Air Force/ Colorado State University 
The research carried out by David Byer and Kenneth Carlson used actual distribution water in 
the batch and pilot scale distribution system [2005]. The water in the pilot system was 
continuously monitored using real-time online instruments. Turbidity, conductivity, chlorine 
residual, TOC, and pH were the parameters monitored and data were collected once a minute.  
Baseline values were established 100 minutes before contaminants were injected. The four 
contaminants were selected based on [Byer & Carlson, 2005]: 
1) Chemical is known to be a weapon 
2) Readily available 
3) Likely to cause illness or death 
4) “Potential to cause public panic and social disruption” 
 The chemicals chosen for the research were sodium cyanide, sodium fluoroacetate, 
aldicarb and sodium aresenate.  There were pumped using a peristaltic pump into a one-inch 
PVC piping network that had a volume of 4.2 l. The online monitoring instruments responded to 
all four of the contaminants. Sodium arsenate had the greatest impact on conductivity responded 
while sodium cyanide and sodium fluoroacetate also had measureable change.  Sodium cyanide 
changed the baseline condition for pH and chlorine residual while aldicarb increased TOC and 
changed chlorine residual. Sodium fluoroacetate also increased the measured TOC. “Results 
from this study indicates that routine water quality instruments can detect chemical disturbances 
in drinking water distribution systems at relatively low concentrations” [Byer & Carlson, 2005].  
2.4.3 Biomonitors 
Research done by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) 
looked at online biomonitors, specifically bluegill fish (Lepomis macrochirus), in source waters.  
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Rapid changes in ventilatory patterns were observed in the fish that correlated with toxicity in 
the water. The research used eight fish in separate flow-through vessels, which had electrodes 
hanging above and below the fish. The electrodes recorded the electrical signals created by the 
fish’s muscle movement, amplified the signal and sent the information to a computer. The fish’s 
ventilatory rate, ventilatory depth (mean signal height), gill purge (cough), frequency, and whole 
body movement were monitored at 15-second intervals.  The water flowing through the tanks 
was also monitored at 15-second intervals for pH, dissolved oxygen, and temperature [Mikol & 
et al, 2007].  Correlations between fish behavior and basic water quality were analyzed to 
identify the fish behaviors that indicate the presence of waterborne toxins.  
A baseline was obtained by recording the movement of the fish for one day. For an alarm 
to be activated, the ventilation pattern of 70% of the fish needed to diverge from the baseline. 
Fish were used in the biomonitoring system for three weeks. During the second week, a new set 
of fish were added to the second monitoring tank to acclimate to water conditions. After 
acclimation, the second group of fish was placed online and the first group was returned to the 
holding tanks [Mikol & et al, 2007].   
The biomonitoring system was used for two different case studies. First was a large 
system that served 17,000 residences and had an effluent average of 300 mgd. The second was a 
small system that discharged approximately 1.1 mgd of water [Mikol & et al, 2007].     
The large system ran for 22 months during which the biomonitor was 96% operational. 
The biomonitor during that period detected an accidental oil spill were the water quality monitors 
(temperature, DO, pH, and conductivity) did not change. The spill was related to a construction 
site upstream. The fish increased their cough rate but no accident report was filed. Analysis of 
the sample from the auto sampler taken during the alarm event showed 47 μg/l of diesel oil in the 
sample [Mikol & et al, 2007].   
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The smaller system was located in Frederick County and draws water from the lower 
Monocacy River watershed. The biomonitor evaluated dechlorinated finished water and effluent 
water for the 8 months the system was operating. During that time, the monitor was operational 
98% of the time [Mikol & et al, 2007]. An alarm event occurred during the case study when the 
fish in the effluent increased their cough rate and eventually all died. The fish in the finished 
water did not go into alarm and show no sign of being affected. This study concluded, that the 
treatment removed the toxin, which would have caused the fish to go into alarm. 
 In both case studies, there were alarms associated with nontoxic events such as changes 
in temperature, and flow interruptions. The study was a feasible method for determining toxicity 
in water but also detected nontoxic events.  
The US Army Center for Environmental Health Research (USACEHR) conducted a 
similar study also using Bluegill fish to monitor water quality. Instead of using the system for 
existing water plants as the NYCDEP did, the USACEHR preformed their case study in a 
workshop. The USACEHR utilized tap water combined with different chemicals. The 
contaminants injected were sodium cyanide, malathion, sodium pentachlorphenate, phenol,  
1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane, tricaine methanesulfonate and zinc sulfate heptahydrate. Each fish was 
measured for coughing, amplitude of ventilation, rate, and whole body movement. The study is 
very similar to the NYCDEP in which eight fish were held in individual chambers and the 
temperature, pH, dissolved oxygen and conductivity were evaluated. The fish were given three 
days to acclimate and four days to determine a baseline for the parameters being assessed.   
Then, the contaminant was injected into three out of the four tanks. The fourth tank was the 
control. The influx of toxin continued for 96 hours and the bluegill’s response was measured 
[Van der Schalie & et al, 2004].  
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Table 3 shows the correlation of the response time of the system to the concentration of 
toxins in the water. All of the control tanks indicated no response.   
 
Table 3. Response of Bluegill Monitor on Injected Chemical Contaminants 
Chemical Concentration Tested (mg/L) 
Bluegill 96-h 
LC50 (mg/L) 
Concentration 
(fraction of 
LC50) 
First alarm 
time (hr) 
1,1,2,2-
Tetrachloroethane 14.6 21 0.69 0.25 
Zinc 2.80 4.5 0.62 0.25 
Cyanide 0.06 0.11 0.55 0.50 
Phenol 11.66 12 0.97 0.50 
Tricaine methane 
sulfonate 60 64 0.94 1.25 
Pentachlorophenol 0.25 0.40 0.62 12.25 
Malathion 0.34 0.34 1 88.5 
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3.0  MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Prior to beginning the experiment, a location for the CWS was selected. The site was selected 
due to its proximity to the drinking water transmission main serving the downtown portion of the 
city, and because PWSA owns a building at this location. The selected equipment for the CWS 
was installed within the building. Water from the distribution system continuously flows into the 
sentinel station and is screened by several monitors.  PWSA has worked closely with a number 
of manufacturers of commercially available monitoring equipment.  These vendors have been 
very cooperative in lending the PWSA their equipment for extended testing in the pilot station.  
The following is a description of the experimental location for the sentinel system and the 
instruments used in the CWS. The contaminants used to challenge the system and experimental 
methods associated with those experiments are also described.  
3.1 EXPERIMENTAL LOCATION 
The sentinel station is located in a building owned by the PWSA that is adjacent to three major 
transmission mains supplying the downtown business area of the city of Pittsburgh. These 
transmission lines include two 36-inch mains and one 20-inch diameter main. A line that runs 
adjacent to the CWS interconnects the transmission mains.  A service line was installed to bring 
water from this interconnect into the pilot station.  A second service line allows the option of 
feeding water into the pilot station from one of the transmission mains. Water from the 
distribution system continuously flows into the CWS. Figure 2 shows the location of the pilot 
system and the proximity to downtown Pittsburgh. The star indicates the location of the pilot 
sentinel system.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Arial View of the Location of the Pilot System   
 
 
 
 
Downtown 
Pittsburgh 
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3.2 MONITORING EQUIPMENT 
The distribution system CWS uses the following equipment for monitoring the water 
quality on a continuous basis and are described in the following sections. 
 Hach Distribution Panel, Event Sensor, and Agent Library; 
 Sievers 900 Online TOC Analyzer; 
 INFICON Online GC-MS; 
 JMAR Biosentry Pathogen Identification System; 
 Biosensor Fish Monitor; and 
 Real UVT 254 Online Monitor. 
3.2.1 Hach Distribution Panel, Event Sensor and Agent Library 
The instrument detects changes in water quality, alarms, and then attempts to identify the 
possible contaminant. The device consists of a ‘Water Panel’ containing several sensors that 
measure routine chemical parameters including TOC, chlorine, pH, turbidity, and conductivity. 
Measurements are taken at one-minute intervals. The system also includes an ‘Event Monitor’ 
that facilitates real-time analysis of data from the Water Panel. The Event Monitor integrates the 
readings for all of the chemical parameters into a composite value or vector. The Event Monitor 
alerts when one or more parameters deviate from a baseline range and exceeds the user-set 
threshold.  
Additionally, Hach has developed an ‘Agent Library’, which contains a signature or 
fingerprint of the changes predicted to occur in multiple parameters when one of 80 different 
contaminants is introduced into the water. The goal of this ‘Agent Library’ is to be able to 
tentatively identify contaminants based on the chemical fingerprint produced by an ‘unknown’ 
substance.  
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The TOC Analyzer continuously monitors the water for total organic carbon using a 
chemical mechanism that is described in EPA method 415.1 and Standard Method 5310 C.  The 
process used to measure TOC combines ultraviolet and chemical oxidation techniques. Acid is 
mixed with the sample in the first step to convert the total inorganic carbon (TIC) to CO2. The 
CO2 is then removed from the sample. The TIC free sample is combined with sodium persulfate 
and passed through the UV reactor. This process causes the TOC in the sample to be converted 
to CO2 and the mixture is then sent into the gas-liquid separator (GLS).  The gas is separated 
from the mixture and sent to the non-dispersive infrared (NDIR) CO2 detector. The concentration 
of CO2 is proportional to the concentration of TOC in the sample and results are displayed in 
mg/l TOC. 
The Hach CL17 chlorine analyzer can measure either free chlorine or total chlorine. The 
CWS measured free chlorine which a measure of the concentration of hypochlorous acid (HOCl) 
and hypochlorite ion (OCl-) in the water. The instrument samples every 2 ½ minutes and utilizes 
the DPD (N, N-diethyl-p-phenylenediamine) colorimetric method.   
USEPA method 180.1 is used to measure turbidity in the 1720E Turbidimeter. Water 
continuously flows into the instrument where a beam of light is directed at the sample. Sensors 
positioned at a 90 degree angle to the photocell and measure the scattered light. The amount of 
turbidity in the water is proportional to the amount of scattered light. The results are recorded in 
nephelometric turbidity units (NTU). 
Conductivity and pH are measured using probes. The pH sensor measures the acidity and 
caustic nature of a water sample, which is reported in pH units. Conductivity is measured in 
microsiemens per centimeter (μS/cm) by a two electrode conductivity sensor. The sensor 
measures the total ionic concentration in the water.  
The Guardian Blue Early Warning System is shown in Figure 3. The Event Monitor and 
Agent Library are labeled A in the figure, B is the TOC analyzer, and C is the Water Panel.  
 
 
Figure 3. Hach Guardian Blue Early Warning System 
 
A 
B 
C 
3.2.2 GE Sievers 900 Online TOC Analyzer 
The GE Sievers TOC analyzer utilizes UV/persulfate oxidation and membrane conductometric 
detection to measure the Total Organic Carbon (TOC) content of the water on a continuous basis.  
The analyzer utilizes the organic carbon in the sample and oxidizes the carbon to CO2. Next, the 
CO2 produced is measured.  The process is similar to the Hach TOC analyzer but instead of the 
NDIR method, the Sievers TOC analyzer uses Membrane Conductometric Detection 
Technology. The method utilizes a selective membrane that allows CO2 to permeate through the 
membrane. The CO2 then travels to the conductive cell to ascertain the concentration of CO2 
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where the detection of TOC ranges from 0.03 ppb to 50 ppm. The Instrument complies with the 
USEPA method 415.3 and Standard Methods 5310 C.  Sievers 900 Online TOC analyzer in the 
pilot system can be seen in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Sievers 900 On-line TOC Analyzer 
 
3.2.3 INFICON HAPSITE Online Smart Gas Chromatograph-Mass Spectrometer 
This gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer utilizes a Situ-Probe purge and trap device to 
continually screen finished water for the presence of volatile organic compounds (VOC). Mass 
spectrometry is an analytical technique that uses mass-to-charge ratio to identify organic 
compounds in a sample. The mass spectrometric results are interpreted through use of AMDIS 
(Automated Mass Spectral Deconvolution and Identification System) and NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology) databases. 
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The calibration library for the HAPSITE includes 68 analytes which samples are 
compared to for identification.  To have a positive identified compound, the mass spectrometry 
qualitative fit must be greater than 75%.  The detection limits of compounds range from the low 
ppb to part-per-trillion (ppt).   Figure 5 shows the GCMS set up at the sentinel station.  
 
 
Figure 5. Inficon HAPSITE Smart GCMS 
 
3.2.4 JMAR Biosentry Pathogen Identification System  
The Biosentry system is a commercial application of MALS technology.  MALS (Multi-Angle 
Light Scattering) involves continual irradiation of a flowing column of water with a laser beam. 
Particles in a column of water, including microbes, scatter the laser beam. The dispersed beam 
produces a pattern, which is monitored by 16 detectors positioned on the opposite side of the 
water column. Microbes are identified by  comparing the pattern of scattered light with a library 
of unique ‘Bio-Optical Signatures’ that have been developed by analyzing known microbes. The 
system analyzes for waterborne microorganisms without using consumable reagents and 
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analyzes approximately 1 mL/min of sample. The detection library for the instrument can be 
seen in Table 4.  The detection library microorganisms are the pathogens which have known 
patterns of scattered light. If, the pattern does not match one of known Bio-optical Signature then 
the data is categorized as unknown. The instrument displays data every minute, which represents 
the average count from the last five minutes for unknown, rod, spore, and protozoan shape 
particles. Figure 6 shows the instrument used in the pilot study.  
 
Table 4. JMAR pathogen detection library 
Microbial 
Classification 
Detection Library 
Microorganism 
BioSentry 
Classification 
• Pseudomonas 
• Legionella 
• E. coli 
• Salmonella 
Bacteria: Rod 
Shaped 
• Shigella 
Rod-shaped 
• Bacillus subtilis spores 
• Bacillus globigii spores Bacteria: Endospores 
• Bacillus cereus spores 
Spore-shaped 
• Cryptosporidium oocysts Protozoa 
• Giardia cysts 
Protozoa-shaped 
 
 
 Figure 6. JMAR Biosentry  
3.2.5 Biosensor Fish Monitor 
In this monitoring device, eight goldfish are maintained in individual chambers under continuous 
flow-through conditions. Electrical signals generated by respiratory muscle movements of 
individual fish are monitored, amplified, and sent to a personal computer for analysis.  
Ventilatory rate, ventilatory depth, gill purge (cough), and whole body movements are measured.  
Baseline behavior data is gathered during a one-hour initiation period to determine the average 
movements and ventilatory patterns of the fish.    
Stress caused by the sudden appearance of a toxic substance in the water causes changes 
in ventilation and body movement.  Deviation from the baseline causes the sensor to produce a 
warning signal. For normal behavior, the data are displayed as amplitude and frequency bar 
graphs for each fish. When the fish sensor goes into the warning mode, the bar graphs change 
from green to yellow.  An alarm is triggered when six of the eight goldfish are in warning mode.  
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Because chlorinated drinking water is being passed through the Biosensor, and fish are 
sensitive to chlorine, a dechlorination system was installed. The dechlorinator pumps sodium 
thiosulfate into the influent where is mixes with the distribution system water before it is passed 
through the fish chambers. Figure 7 shows the biomonitor in the pilot CWS.  
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Figure 7. Biosensor Fish Monitor 
 
3.2.6 Real Tech UVT 254 Online Monitor 
The Real Tech UVT (ultra violet transmittance) measures the transmittance of UV light at a 
wavelength of 254 nm through a water sample.  Water continuously flows through two 
rectangular quartz flow cells. On either side of the rotating cells, is a UV light source and UV 
sensor, which takes measurements at 90-degrees to the cells every 10 seconds [Real Tech Inc, 
2008].  The system provides an instantaneous indication of natural organic matter (NOM) and 
aromatic organics. Calibrating the system is simple and requires pure (distilled) water to be 
passed through the instrument as a reference sample. Fluctuation and drift can occur as a result 
of long time periods between calibrations and can give inaccurate readings.  
The monitor has a baseline range, which depends on the water quality. An increase in 
NOM causes the measured transmittance value to decrease. In addition, an increase of turbidity 
may also cause the measured value to decrease.  Figure 8 shows the UVT installed in the pilot 
CWS. 
 
 
Figure 8. Real Tech UVT 254 Online Monitor 
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3.3 INJECTION SYSTEM AND METHOD  
Water and contaminants of interest for a given study were pumped into the pilot station using a 
peristaltic pump. The arrangement of the contaminant, valve, and distribution water are depicted 
in Figure 9. A series of backflow preventers, check valves, and a manual shut off valve were 
installed to prevent contaminated water from flowing back into the distribution system.  
Monitoring 
Instruments Distribution System Water 
Peristaltic 
Pump 
Contaminant (stock solution)
Valve 
Injection 
System 
 
Figure 9. Pumping Set up  
 
The online instruments, discussed above, continually monitor the distribution system 
water, which provides a baseline for the experiments.  Contaminants were injected to stress and 
test the system. Normal monitoring conditions (no contaminant being injected) the valve, 
connecting the injection system, was in the closed position. To allow the substances to be 
pumped into the distribution water, the valve was opened to allow the contaminant to flow 
through the monitoring instruments. When the valve was initially opened, the monitoring 
instruments typically showed an increase in turbidity due to settled particulate matter in the 
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pipes. Water was then pumped through the injection system to allow the turbidity to stabilize and 
to regain a typical baseline. The time and flow rate to stabilize the system to the original turbidity 
differed for each run.  Once the baseline was reestablished, a contaminant was pumped into the 
monitored water. The contaminants were measured using different water quality parameters and 
a variety of instruments.  Water was then injected at the end of a run, to flush the monitoring 
system of injected contaminant. The contaminants used in the study included: 
Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) Sodium Fluoroacetate(NaFC2H2O2) 
Nitric Acid (HNO3) Bug-B-Gone 
Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Fire Suppression Foam 
Fluorosilicic Acid (H2SiF6) Paint Thinner 
Copper Sulfate (CuSO4) Toluene (C6H5CH3) 
Plastic Spheres Carbon Tetrachloride(CCl4) 
E. coli Bacillus Atrophaeus spores 
Cryptosporidium oocysts Giardia lamblia cysts 
 
The chemical and biological contaminants were utilized for the challenge study to mimic 
an intentional or accidental contamination event in the finished drinking water system. The 
chemicals chosen for the study represent a variety of substance that could result from a spill, 
overdosing or a terrorist attack.  Fire Foam was tested in the challenge study because an 
accidental contamination event had occurred in Pittsburgh several months earlier in the water 
distribution system by firefighters during a warehouse fire. The commercially available 
rodenticide and pesticide are of security concern for intentional contamination because they are 
easy to obtain. The E. coli and Cryptosporidium were used represent inadequately treated water 
from the water treatment plant. The microbes used are common organisms that are found in 
water that has not been treated properly. The intentional contaminates are chemicals and 
biological a person or group could possibly inject to cause harm to the consumer.  
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A summary of the concentration, volume, rate, and effluent concentration for the 
chemical contaminants is shown in Table 6 and a summary of the concentration, volume, rate, 
and effluent concentration for the microbes are depicted in Table 8. 
3.3.1 Chemical Contaminants 
3.3.1.1 Fluorosilicic Acid (H2SiF6) 
Fluorosilicic Acid (HFS) is used in drinking water treatment plants to increase the 
concentration of fluoride in finished water. PWSA’s fluoride concentration goal is 1.0 mg/l but 
can range from 0.05 to 1.45 mg/l in finished water according to the 2006 Water Quality Report 
for Pittsburgh. Samples are collected and analyzed daily to determine fluoride concentration and 
the dose of HFS is adjusted to meet the concentration goal. The maximum allowable 
concentration of fluoride in Pennsylvania drinking water is 2 ppm.  Fluoride strengthens teeth 
against acids created by the bacteria in plague. At concentrations greater than 4 mg/l, fluoride 
causes mottling of teeth and a concentration greater than 15-20 mg/l causes fluorosis [MWH, 
2005]. HFS was chosen as a contaminant in this study because of past instances of accidental 
fluoride overfeeds in Pennsylvania and other states.   
Fluoride was introduced into the system using a 23.2% solution of fluorosilicic Acid, 
H2SiF6 (HFS).  A volume of 12.5 ml of HFS was added to 12.5 l of distribution water to create 
the target concentration of contaminant. The actual measured concentration of the stock solution 
injection water was approximately 200 ppm of fluoride.  The injection water was introduced into 
the system through a pump at a rate of 70 ml/min to the distribution line, which had an average 
flow of 2,200 ml/min. Four HFS contaminant trials were conducted with an average final 
concentration of 7.6 ppm F-.  
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3.3.1.2 Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) 
Hydrochloric acid is commonly used in drinking water treatment processes to reduce the 
alkalinity of the water. The chemical is a strong acid and for 0.1 N solution the pH is 1.1. The 
management of pH can control the formation of solids such as calcium carbonate and the 
corrosion of conduit material [MWH, 2005].  Because hydrochloric acid is used in some drinking 
water treatment processes, there is the possibility for accidental contamination to occur. Health 
issues associated with acute oral contact of HCl can include corrosion of the mucous membrane, 
esophagus and stomach [USEPA, 2007]. Swallowing excessive quantities may be fatal. In 
rabbits, the dose at which half of the test animals died, the oral LD50, is 900 mg/kg.  
Hydrochloric acid of 0.1 N was added to distribution water until the stock injection 
solution reached a pH of approximately 2.0. The stock solution was injected into the pilot 
monitoring system at a flow rate of 70 ml/min.  Both run had an overall flow rate of 3.24 l/min 
with two liters of stock solution being injected during the two runs.  
3.3.1.3 Nitric Acid (HNO3) 
Nitric Acid is used for many industrial applications for cleaning oxidizing or etching 
[NPI, 2005]. A common uses of nitric acid is to remove calcium carbonate buildup. Nitric acid 
reacts violently with many organic compounds and may cause fire and explosion [ILO, 2006]. 
The strong acid also reacts violently with bases and is corrosive to metal [NPI, 2005]. If exposed 
to the skin or eyes, the substance may cause serious burns. Ingesting the chemical may cause a 
sore throat, abdominal pains, vomiting, shock or collapse [ILO, 2006].  The lowest lethal does 
recorded for humans is 430 mg/kg. 
The contaminant was created by mixing one normal nitric acid to the distribution water to 
achieve a pH of approximately 2.  The stock solution was pumped into the system at a flow rate 
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of 70 ml/min.  The first run, approximated 3.5 liter of stock solution with a pH of 1.91 was 
pumped into the system. The second run had a pH of 2.15 and 2.3 liter was pumped through the 
pilot system. The last run had a pH of 2.07 and a volume of 1.9 liter was used.  
3.3.1.4 Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) 
Sodium Hydroxide is commonly known as caustic soda, lye, or sodium hydrate, and is 
often used in drinking water treatment. When there is insufficient carbonate hardness in the 
water, caustic soda can be used to decrease hardness instead of lime [MWH, 2005]. In addition 
to softening water, sodium hydroxide is used in drain cleaners, detergents and soaps. The 
chemical is corrosive when it comes in contact with skin and eyes. The lowest published LD50 
for rabbits is 500 mg/kg [CHEMTREC, 2007]. In the presence of various metals, sodium 
hydroxide may produce flammable and explosive gases [CHEMTREC, 2007].  
1 N Sodium hydroxide of was added to distribution water to create the stock injection 
solution. Two runs were performed with the contaminant. An average of 1.8 liters was pumped 
into the pilot system for about 30 minutes. Run one combined 28 ml of NaOH to 2500 ml of 
distribution water to create a pH of 12.17. The second run had a pH of 12.5 and used 50 mL of 
NaOH and 2500 mL of distribution water. Both runs were pumped into the system at 70 ml/min.  
3.3.1.5 Copper Sulfate (CuSO4) 
Copper sulfate is commonly used as an herbicide, fungicide and pesticide. CuSO4 is 
commonly used in drinking water treatment to control algae [MWH, 2005]. Poisoning can occur 
from ingesting 1 to 12 grams of copper sulfate [Cornell University, 1994]. Some of the 
symptoms include metallic taste, burning pain in the chest and abdomen, nausea, vomiting, 
diarrhea, headache, sweating, and shock.  The LD50 for ingestion of copper sulfate for rats is 30 
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mg/kg and the EPA drinking water limit concentration of copper sulfate is 1 ppm [Cornell 
University, 1994]. 
For the copper sulfate, three runs were performed. Each of the runs was pumped in the 
system at 70 ml/min for a period of 30 to 50 minutes.  The non-dilution injection water consists 
of 0.44 g, 0.8 g and 1.25 g of CuSO4 added to two liters of tap water. The two lower 
concentrations were added over flow rate of 1.89 ml/min. The higher concentration was pumped 
into an overall flow rate of 3.98 ml/min.  
3.3.1.6 Bug-B-Gon 
Ortho Bug-B-Gon Max Lawn and Garden Insect Killer is a common household 
insecticide that contains Bifenthrin (0.115%), C23H22ClF3O2.   The chemical is highly toxic to 
aquatic organisms and moderately toxic to mammals when ingested. Acute contact with 
Bifenthrin can cause convulsions, tremors, and diarrhea, salivation, and irritability to sound and 
touch. The oral LD50 for female rats is 54 mg/kg [Cornell University, 1995].   
Four different concentrations of Bug-B-Gon were pumped through the pilot system. Each 
stock injection solution was pumped into the system at a rate of 70 ml/min. Two liters of distilled 
water was combined with 1, 5, 10, and 20 ml of insecticide.   
3.3.1.7 Sodium Fluoroacetate (NaFC2H2O2) 
Sodium fluoroacetate is an organic chemical that is used as a poison for vertebrate 
animals.  Common animals that the poison is used to control include rabbits, pigs, foxes and wild 
dogs. The chemical is highly soluble in water and is considered very highly toxic. In drinking 
water, Sodium fluoroacetate is projected to increase conductivity and TOC. The oral LD50 is 0.1 
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mg/kg and ingesting the organic chemical can cause long-term cardiac damage. Vomiting, 
seizures, and coma are signs of exposure. Mortality is possible at high doses.  
Two runs of sodium fluoroacetate were completed with a target effluent concentration of 
0.5 ppm and 5 ppm based on a flow rate of 3.2 l/min. Distilled water was used instead of 
distribution water to make the stock injection solution. The experiments used 45.7 mg and 457.1 
mg of sodium fluoroacetate and was added to two liters of distilled water.  
3.3.1.8 Fire Foam 
Fire is a commonly used substance to suppress fires, because combined with water the 
substance reduces the surface tension of water. Deceased surface tension allows water to 
penetrate surfaces where water alone might run off. In addition, the use of fire foam mixed with 
water decreases the amount of water need to extinguish a fire. The chemical components of 
Knockdown, one of the commercially available mixtures of fire fighting foam, can be seen in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The composition of Knockdown a fire fighting foam concentrate (Kidde Fire Fighting, 2007) 
Components % Weight 
Water 48 -70% 
Proprietary mixture of synthetic detergents 20 -30% 
1,2 Propanediol  8- 12% 
(2-methoxymethylethoxy) Propanol 2 -4% 
Proprietary mixture of corrosion inhibitors 0 -6% 
 
 
Ingestion of small amounts is not likely to cause injury but ingestion of large amounts 
may cause irritation. The LD50 for the concentration in Sprague-Dawley Rats is greater than 
5000mg/kg [Kiddie Fire Fighting, 2007].  
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Dilutions of the fire suppression foam concentration were prepared to attain a final 
effluent concentration of 0.001% and 0.003% of foam. The final concentrations were achieved 
by adding 1 mL and 3 mL, respectively to two liters of distilled water. The typical concentration 
of foam for a structural fire would be 0.5% to 0.7%. The value used for the pilot is 500 times 
smaller than the actual value used to treat fire because of fear that a concentration that great 
would cause problems in the monitoring instruments. Approximately two liters of stock solution 
was pumped into the system at a flow rate of 70 ml/min.  
3.3.1.9 Paint Thinner 
The main components in paint thinner are mineral spirits or Stoddard solvent with trace 
amounts of benzene. Paint thinner contains about 95 to 100 percent Stoddard solvent and up to 
two percent benzene. The EPA MCL for benzene in drinking water is 5 ppb [USEPA, 2006]. The 
EPA classifies benzene as a human carcinogen. The oral LD50 observed in rats is 1800 mg/kg 
[Nova Chemicals, 2008]. When large quantities of paint thinner are ingested, vomiting, dizziness 
and convulsions could occur. 
Two concentrations of paint thinner were pumped at a rate of 70 ml/min into the 
monitoring system. The first concentration was 2 ml of paint thinner added to 2 liters of distilled 
water and 1.5 liters was injected into the pilot distribution water. The second concentration was 5 
ml of paint thinner added to 2 liters of distilled water and injected for 40 minutes and pumped 3 
liters into the monitoring system.  
3.3.1.10 Toluene (C6H5CH3) 
Toluene, also called methyl benzene, occurs naturally in crude oil and is a byproduct of 
gasoline production and coke from coal processes. The chemical is highly flammable and is 
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water insoluble. This aromatic hydrocarbon is used in manufacturing plastics, rubbers, 
disinfectants and is an additive to lead-free gasoline. The EPA MCL in drinking water is 1 ppm 
[USEPA, 2006]. When large quantities of Toluene are ingested, vomiting, dizziness and 
convulsions could occur. The lowest published lethal oral concentration (LDLO) for humans is 
50 mg/kg [Oxford University, 2005].  
Two concentrations of the stock injection solution was pumped through the system at a 
rate of 70 ml/min. The injection water was prepared by combining 1 μl and 5 μl of toluene to 2 
liters of distilled water.  Two liters of the stock solution were pumped through the pilot 
distribution system with an average flow rate of 3.25 ml/min.  
3.3.1.11 Carbon Tetrachloride (CCl4) 
Carbon tetrachloride is an organic chemical that does not occur naturally. Fire 
extinguishers, dry cleaning agents, pesticides and manufacturing of nylon are common uses of 
the chemical. A large portion is used in the production of chlorofluorocarbon propellants and 
refrigerants. Due to harmful effects to the environments, a majority of the uses have been 
banned. The EPA MCL for drinking water is 5 ppb and it has been determined that carbon 
tetrachloride is a probable human carcinogen. Extended exposure can cause kidney, central 
nervous system, and liver damage. The oral LD for guinea pigs is 5760 mg/kg of carbon 
tetrachloride [Oxford University, 2004].  
Three and five microliters were added to 2.4 liter and two liters of distilled water 
respectively. The stock injection solutions had a concentration of 2 ppm and 1.5 ppm.  Both were 
pumped at a flow rate of 70 ml/min. The flow rate of the pilot system was about 3.2 ml/min.  
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Table 6. Summary of the chemical injected contaminants 
Chemical 
Evaluated Injection 
Solution 
Volume 
(L) 
System Flow 
Rate (L/min) 
Calculated Effluent 
Concentration* 
198 ppm 3.36 2.50 7.06 ppm F- 
≈ 200 ppm 2.1 2.48 7.02 ppm F- 
192 ppm 2.66 3.15 9.77 ppm F- 
HFS 
214 ppm 2.17 3.15 6.60 ppm F- 
2.04 pH 1.75 3.24 1.5 pH drop HCl 
2.09 pH 2.1 3.24 1.5 pH drop 
1.91 pH 3.34 3.20 2.1 pH decrease 
2.15 pH 2.24 3.07 1.5 pH drop HNO3  
2.07 pH 1.89 3.22 1.5 pH drop 
12.17 pH 1.75 3.18 1 pH increase NaOH 
12.5 pH 1.89 3.55 1.2 pH increase 
220 ppm 2.24 1.89 8.1 ppm 
400 ppm 2.3 1.80 15.5 ppm CuSO4 
625 ppm 2.52 3.98 11 ppm 
23 ppm 2 3.34 0.5 ppm Sodium 
Fluoroacetate 230 ppm 2 3.34 5 ppm 
500 ppm 3.64 3.18 10 ppm 
2500 ppm 3.5 3.29 50 ppm 
5000 ppm 2.17 3.79 100 ppm 
Bug-B-Gone 
10,000 ppm 2.59 3.79 200 ppm 
500 ppm 2 3.30 0.001% Fire Foam 
1500 ppm 2 3.58 0.003% 
1000 ppm 1.54 3.79 ≈ 20 ppm Paint Thinner 
2500 ppm 2.94 3.79 ≈ 50 ppm 
3.7 ppm 2 3.20 86 ppb CCl4 2.8 ppm 2 3.15 62 ppb 
2.2 ppm 2 3.15 49 ppb Toluene 
0.4 ppm 2 3.34 9 ppb 
 
* The calculated effluent concentration was based on the concentration of the stock solution, 
pumping flow rate, and system flow rate. 
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3.3.2 Biological Based Contaminants 
3.3.2.1 Spheres 
Two sizes of plastic spheres were injected into the monitoring system as models for 
microbes in the drinking water. For the two micron spheres, a count of 10 million and 100 
million spheres were injected into the system. Similarly, 0.8 μ spheres were injected into the 
monitored water at counts of 10 million, 50 million and 100 million. All spheres were added to 
two liters of distilled water.  A pumping rate of 140 ml/min was used for all the sphere runs. 
Duplicate runs were conducted for each concentration.  
3.3.2.2 Cryptosporidium parvum 
Cryptosporidium parvum is apathogenic protozoan that can cause gastrointestinal illness 
if ingested. For healthy people the minimum infective dose is 30 oocysts and a median infective 
dose is 132 oocyst [Bitton, 2005].  There are also studies that suggest that ingestion of as little as 
one oocyst may cause infection. Cryptosporidium parvum in intake water for drinking water are 
not always completely removed or inactivated by traditional process such as sand filtration and 
chlorination but the parasite can be partial inactivated by limewater softening.  Due to the 
pathogen not being removed by traditional process breakouts do occur. “Compliance with U.S. 
EPA standards does not guarantee protection from infection with Cryptosporidium” [Bitton, 
2005]. 
A single run of inactivated cryptosporidium was injected into the system at a rate of 140 
ml/min. Ten million cryptosporidium oocyst were added to 2 liters of distilled water to create the 
stock solution for injection. The calculated effluent concentration cryptosporidium oocyst  that 
passed through the monitoring system was calculated to be 200 oocyst/ml.  
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3.3.2.3 Giardia lamblia 
Giardia lamblia is a flagellated protozoan parasite that is commonly found in domestic 
wastewater.  Infection is caused by ingesting 25 to 100 cysts and the infection can cause 
abdominal pains, nausea, fatigue and weight loss [Bitton, 2005]. Giardiasis is rarely fatal but it is 
estimated in the United States that 2.5 million cases of giardiasis occurs annually [Bitton, 2005]. 
The most common case of outbreaks is due to consumption of water that was untreated or 
inappropriately treated, which could mean chlorinated but not filtered drinking water.  
To create the stock injection solution, 10 million inactivated Giardia lamblia was mixed 
with two liters of distilled water. The concentrated was pumped into the monitoring system at 
140 ml/min. A single run was conducted with Giardia cysts.  
3.3.2.4 Escherichia coli 
The facultative anaerobic bacterium Escherichia coli lives in the intestinal tract of warm 
blooded animals. The majority of E. coli strains are harmless and are common habitants of 
human gastrointestinal tract. A few groups are pathogenic and are related to waterborne disease 
outbreaks. These strains can be seen in Table 7. The infectious dose of the rod shape bacteria can 
range from 106 -109 organisms.  
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Table 7. Bacteria associated with waterborne disease(MWH, 2005) 
Bacteria Size, μm (diameter x length) Health Effects in Healthy Persons 
Enteropathogenic  
E. coli (EPEC) 
0.3-0.5 x 1-2 Traveller’s diarrhea 
Enteroaggregative  
E. coli (EaggEC) 
0.3-0.5 x 1-2 Childhood diarrhea and among 
immunocompromised 
Enteroinvasive 
 E. coli (EIEC) 
0.3-0.5 x 1-2 Childhood diarrhea 
Enterohemorrhagic  
E. coli (EHEC) 
0.3-0.5 x 1-2 Bloody diarrhea, occasionally hemolytic uremic 
syndrome (HUS) 
Enterotoxigenic  
E. coli (ETEC) 
0.3-0.5 x 1-2 Traveller’s diarrhea 
 
 
Enterohemorrhagic E. coli (EHEC) has an infectious dose of less than 100 organisms 
which much lower than the other strains and the very young and very old are most susceptible by 
the pathogen. EHEC cause more than 20,000 infections and as many as 250 deaths each year in 
the United States [Bitton, 2005]. EPA does not require public water systems to monitor for E. 
coli but instead total coliform. When samples are positive for coliform bacteria, then the water 
facility must analyze for either E. coli or fecal coliform. Positive tests would indicate the 
presence of animal waste or human sewage in the water [EPA, 2006].  
Four different concentrations of E. coli were pumped through the pilot monitoring 
system. Approximately 200 billion, 100 billion, 4 million and 3 million CFU were added to two 
liters of distilled water to create a stock solution for injection into the monitoring water.  The E. 
coli was pumped into the system at a rate of 140 mL/min. The final concentration of E. coli 
passing through the monitoring system was 4.6 million, 2.7 million, 80, 67 CFU/ mL.  
 
 49 
3.3.2.5 Bacillus atrophaeus 
Bacillus anthracis spores were used as a surrogate for Bacillus anthracis spores (anthrax) 
which are non-flagellated, rod shape, facultative anaerobic, pathogenic bacteria.  Bacillus 
anthracis is classified as a possible bioterrorism agent. The bacilli are about 1 μm wide and 3 μm 
long and usually straight. The estimated infectious dose from inhalation, which is the most 
deadly, is 6000 spores [Bitton, 2005]. Mortality rates exceed 80 percent for individual who 
inhale B. anthracis spores [MWH, 2005]. Signs of anthrax infection include influenza like 
symptoms followed by chest wall edema and hemorrhagic meningitis. Treatment delayed beyond 
48 hours will result in death.  
Two concentrations of Bacillus atrophaeus spores were injected into the system at a rate 
of 140 ml/min. The stock solution concentrations were prepared by combining 10 million and 30 
million inactivated Bacillus spores to two liters of distilled water.  
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Table 8. Summary of injected biological based contaminants 
Contaminant  Injection Solution 
Injection 
System 
Flow Rate 
(mL/min) 
Volume 
(L) 
System Flow 
Rate 
(L/min) 
Calculated 
Effluent 
Concentration * 
10x106 
spheres/2L 140 2 3.634 193 spheres/mL 
10x106 
spheres/2L 140 2 2.753 254 spheres/mL 
10x107 
spheres/2L 140 2 3.634 1926 spheres/mL 
Spheres (2μm) 
10x107 
spheres/2L 140 2 2.753 2543 spheres/mL 
10x106 
spheres/2L 140 2 3.723 188 spheres/mL 
10x106 
spheres/2L 140 2 3.390 206 spheres/mL 
5x107 
spheres/2L 140 2 3.268 1071 spheres/mL 
5x107 
spheres/2L 140 2 3.268 1071 spheres/mL 
10x107 
spheres/2L 140 2 3.723 1880 spheres/mL 
Spheres (0.8μm) 
10x107 
spheres/2L 140 2 3.390 2065 spheres/mL 
Cryptosporidium 
10x106 
oocyst/2L 140 2 3.154 222 oocysts/mL 
Giardia lamblia  1x106 CFU/2L 140 2 3.154 116 CFU/mL 
2.11x1011 
CFU/2L 140 2 3.154 4.66x106 CFU/mL
1.17x1011 
CFU/2L 140 2 2.988 2.74x106 CFU/mL
3.9x106 
CFU/2L 140 2 3.441 80 CFU/mL 
E. coli 
 2.9x106 
CFU/2L 140 2  2.912 67 CFU/mL 
10x106 
spores/2L 140 2 3.154 222 spores/mL Bacillus 
Atrophaeus 30x106 
spores/2L 140 2 3.154 666 spores/mL 
 
* The calculated effluent concentration passing through the monitoring system was based on the 
concentration of the stock solution, pumping flow rate, and system flow rate. 
3.4 NORMAL BACKGROUND VARIATION 
Determining the difference between normal background variation and a contamination event is 
vital. Too many false alarms can cause “the boy who cried wolf” symptom where initially every 
alarm is evaluated with no water quality issues. After responding to many false alarms 
responders are less likely to react which could result in an actual contamination event affecting 
public health.  The normal variation in water quality must be evaluated to set trigger level for the 
instruments.  Numbers exceeding the value will indicate an alarm.  
3.4.1  Detection Limit 
Water quality in a public drinking water distribution system can vary as a result of a number of 
conditions including: source water quality, variation in the water treatment process, variations in 
hydraulic conditions in the distribution system, accidental back siphonage, and water main 
breaks. Consequently, pH, TOC, conductivity, turbidity, and chlorine are changing constantly 
and a single mean value cannot be calculated to represent a baseline for the values. To resolve 
this problem, a range of data will be used to represent normal water quality. The data sets are 
composed of continuous monthly readings of TOC, chlorine, conductivity, pH and turbidity.  
The mean for each data was determined using Equation 1. 
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Where n is the number of samples in the data set. The mean is a useful representation of 
the average value of the data set but does account for variability. Standard deviation accounts for 
the data variability and was calculated for the data series using Equation 2. 
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Adding and subtracting the standard deviation to the mean offers a range for detection but 
in some cases only 60 percent of the data points will fall within the range. To encapsulate a 
majority of the data but still show contamination events, three standard deviations were chosen 
to represent normal variation. Values exceeding three standard deviations from the mean value 
were classified abnormal and possible indication of a contamination event. The detection limit 
was calculated by the mean value plus three standard deviations shown in Equation 3.  
 
Detection limits = 3x  (Equation 3) 
 
Accord to Chebyshev inequality, at least 89% of the data set should fall within three 
standard deviations from the mean.  For the TOC, chlorine, pH, conductivity and turbidity data 
sets, between 97.7 and 99.9 of the data point fell within the limits. Figure 10 shows the detection 
limits for TOC and an incidence of increase of TOC related to Giardia being injected into the 
pilot system.  
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 Figure 10. Detection limit for TOC during a injection trial analyzing Giardia cysts 
 
The TOC responded to the inactivated agent, formalin, during the injected of Giardia 
lamblia. The organic solution, formalin is an aqueous solution of formaldehyde, H2CO. Changes 
in water quality parameters, due to a toxin being injected, will be evaluated against the detection 
limit to determine if the chemical can be detected.    
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4.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Early warning monitoring of possible contaminants is necessary to protect the consumer 
from accidental or intentional contamination. Rapid detection instruments provide real time data 
about the water quality. If a contamination event were to occur, rapid detection would decrease 
the response time and possibly decrease the number of resulting illnesses or deaths.   
There are five approaches used within the drinking water industry to monitor the quality 
of finished water and screen for signs of intentional or accidental contamination. They include: 
 Monitoring routine chemical parameters; 
 Real-time toxicity biomonitoring; 
 Monitoring for radiation to detect the presence of radionuclides; 
 Detecting, identifying, and quantifying specific chemical contaminants; and 
 Detecting, Identifying, and quantifying specific pathogens. 
This research did not address the use of radiation to detect radionuclides. However, the 
pilot CWS did utilize monitors for the other four approaches. To challenge the system, 
contaminants were pumped into the distribution line and deviations from baseline values were 
recorded. The contaminants used for this research included: 
Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) Sodium Fluoroacetate(NaFC2H2O2) 
Nitric Acid (HNO3) Bug-B-Gon 
Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Fire Suppression Foam 
Hydrofluosilic Acid (H2SiF6) Paint Thinner 
Copper Sulfate (CuSO4) Toluene (C6H5CH3) 
Plastic Spheres Carbon Tetrachloride(CCl4) 
E. coli Bacillus Atrophaeus 
Cryptosporidium Giardia lamblia 
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4.1 CHEMICAL CHALLENGE EXPERIMENTS 
The chemicals mentioned previously were used to challenge the Hach Guardian Blue System, the 
Sievers TOC, and the Real Tech UVT. The Hach Panel measures turbidity, free chlorine, pH, 
conductivity, and TOC. The Real Tech UVT detects aromatic organics and NOM by measuring 
percent transmittance using 254 nm wavelength light. At the beginning of each run, a turbidity 
spike occurred as the valve connecting the injected system, shown in Figure 8, was opened. 
Water was pumped through the injection system until turbidity returned to the previous baseline. 
UVT was also affected as a result of the valve to the injection system being opened. After the 
baseline was regained, contaminants were introduced into the water supply by the injection 
system to stress the system and test the chemical detection instruments. The changes caused by 
the toxins were recorded and analyzed. For each toxin, changes in turbidity, free chlorine, pH, 
conductivity, TOC, and UVT were evaluated. A summary of the contaminants, concentration and 
the affected parameters are shown in Table 91.  
 
1 All of the biological trials had a decrease in conductivity as a result of the distilled water for preparation 
of the stock solution.  Cryptosporidium and Giardia increased both the Sievers and Hach TOC as a results of the 
inactivation agent. The Bacillus spores induced a decrease concentration of chlorine 
Table 9. Broad Spectrum Analysis for Chemical Contamination   
 Theoretical 
Effluent 
Concentration 
Trigger Turbidity Chlorine pH Conductivity Hach TOC 
Sievers 
TOC UVT  
7.06 mg/L F- X     X X       
7.02 mg/L F- X     X X       
9.77 mg/L F- X     X X       HFS 
6.60 mg/L F- X     X X       
1.1 pH decrease X     x         
1.5 pH decrease X     X X       HCl 
1.5 pH decrease X     X X       
2.1 pH decrease X     X X       
1.5 pH decrease X     X X       HNO3  
1.5 pH decrease X     X X       
1 pH increase X X   X X       NaOH 1.2 pH increase X X   X X       
8.1 mg/L   X   X X     X 
15.5 mg/L X X   X X     X CuSO4 
11 mg/L X X   X X     X 
0.5 mg/L         X   n/a   Sodium 
Fluoroacetate 5 mg/L X       X X n/a   
10 mg/L         X       
50 mg/L         X       
100 mg/L         X X X   Bug-B-Gone 
200 mg/L     X X X X X   
0.001% X   X   X X X   Fire Foam 0.003% X   X   X X X   
20 mg/L         X       Paint Thinner 100 mg/L         X       
86 μg/L         X   n/a   CCl4 62 μg/L         X   n/a   
48 μg/L         X   n/a   Toluene 9 μg/L         X   n/a   
  Notes:       X = Detected by Instrument n/a =Instrument not online during testing
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The Hach Event Sensor did not alarm when exposed to various concentrations of Bug-B-
Gon, paint thinner, carbon tetrachloride, or toluene in the distribution water. Toluene and carbon 
tetrachlorine concentrations were in the ppb range and were not predicted to be detected by 
routine chemical parameters. Bug-B-Gon at the highest concentrations had changes in chlorine, 
pH, conductivity, and TOC but still did not produce an alarm. The Hach Panel detected an 
increase in turbidity for copper sulfate, which could have been the result of solid copper sulfate 
that had not dissolved completely. In addition, sodium hydroxide induced an increase of 
turbidity.  Fire foam and Bug-B-Gon were the only contaminants that caused changes in 
chlorine. As predicted, the acids and bases triggered either a decrease or increase in pH. Copper 
sulfate and the highest concentration of Bug-B-Gon also caused deviations in pH measurements. 
For all the chemicals besides the lower concentration of HCl, conductivity either decreased or 
increased.  Running a blank sample of distilled water through the CWS resulted in a 20 μS/cm 
decrease in conductivity. Contaminants mixed with distilled water illustrated similar results in 
respect to conductivity. For the fire foam and the two highest concentrations of Bug-B-Gon, both 
were detected by Sievers and Hach TOC analyzers. Unfortunately, the Sievers TOC was not 
operational for the sodium fluoroacetate experiment because of routine maintenance. The Hach 
TOC did detect changes in TOC for the higher concentration of sodium fluoroacetate. The UVT 
only detected changes in transmittance for copper sulfate. As mentioned before, the change in 
transmittance could be correlated to the chemical not being completely dissolved.  
Examples of the raw data from three sensors can be seen in Figure 11, Figure 12, and 
Figure 13.  Figure 11 illustrates the response of the Hach Event Sensor Alarm to the injected 
contaminant HFS. Turbidity peaks were synonymous for each injected contaminant event. The 
actual effluent concentration of fluoride was 7 ppm as measured by an ion selective electrode. 
The initial response to the valve being opened can be seen in the first peak of Figure 11. The 
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second peak corresponds to deviation of pH which triggered the alarm. Trigger values greater 
than a warning threshold of 1.0, activate an alarm for the Hach Panel. This alarm value can be 
adjusted by the instrument operator. When the Plant Alarm is activated, the Hach Event Sensor 
begins to match the pattern of change in chemical parameters to the patterns recorded for various 
contaminants in the Event library. If a match is found, an agent alarm generates the possible 
contaminant(s) and the percent certainty for the identification. For the HFS run, the Hach Event 
Sensor matched fluorosilicic acid and mercuric chloride to the event.  
Figure 12 shows turbidity related to the HFS run. An increase of turbidity, for HFS, only 
occurred when the valve to the injection system was opened. HFS did not affect the turbidity. 
The figure also shows that the pumping of HFS only commences once the turbidity regained the 
original baseline.  
Figure 13 is the raw data for pH during the experiment. As predicted, there was a 
decrease in pH as a result of the acid being pumped into the pilot system. The result of the acid 
was a decrease in pH of 2 units. The water regained the original baseline value once injection of 
HFS stopped. This is an indication that the spike was a result of the acid. 
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After each of the contaminants was injected into the pilot sentinel station, data were 
collected from the Sievers TOC analyzer and Hach Panel and analyzed. The values for TOC, 
conductivity, chlorine, pH, turbidity and the trigger were graphed on the vertical and time on the 
horizontal as shown in Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13. Each of the graphs was studied to 
determine if detection occurred. The results were summarized using bar graphs. Maximums, 
minimums, and baseline values were calculated for each run. The difference between the 
maximum and minimum from the baseline was calculated.  Next, the average of all the baseline 
values was calculated to give an overall baseline. The difference for each contaminant was added 
to or subtracted from the overall baseline to summarize the effects of the contaminants on each 
parameter. Figures 14 to 19 illustrate the response of each of the detectors to the battery of 
challenge contaminants. Individual bars in a cluster represent repeat trials.  
Figure 14 depicts the response of the Hach Event sensor to various concentrations of 
contaminants. The Event Sensor trigger is a response of the five chemical sensors; turbidity, 
chlorine, pH, conductivity, TOC and temperature. The dashed line in the graphs represents the 
threshold of deviation for the five sensors. The alarm set point selected for the CWS research 
was one. Trigger values above one activate the plant alarm on the Hach Panel.  
Bug-B-Gon, paint thinner, carbon tetrachloride, toluene, and the lowest concentration of 
copper sulfate and sodium fluoroacetate did not cause an alarm. The most significant response 
was HFS at a fluoride concentration of 9.77 ppm. As mentioned before, carbon tetrachloride and 
toluene concentrations were in the ppb range and not within the panels detection limit. Bug-B-
Gon was predicted to trigger an alarm because multiple parameters changed due to the injection 
of the contaminant. Unfortunately, the changes were not significant enough to trigger a plant 
alarm. 
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Figure 14. Summary of Runs for the Hach Event Sensor Trigger Alarm 
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Figures 15 to 20 show the response during the trials of the five individual chemical 
sensors that comprise the Hach Panel.  
Figure 15 shows the changes in turbidity causes by the different contaminants. Sodium 
hydroxide and copper sulfate were the only contaminant that produced an increase in turbidity.  
Copper sulfate was predicted to increase the turbidity because of the color of the solution and the 
chemical was not completely dissolved. Conversely, sodium hydroxide was unpredicted. 
Speculation for the increase in turbidity was that the contaminant was removing matter from the 
pipes. The proposal was not tested for validity.  For each run, the turbidity increased initially 
because of the valve to the pump being opened. Water was pumped into the sentinel system until 
the previous baseline was regained.  
Figure 16 demonstrates the response the of the free chlorine analyzer to various 
contaminants. Chlorine was a difficult parameter to assess changes because the chlorine residual 
was constantly changing. Therefore, making the changes related to the injected contaminant 
difficult to assess. Example would be chlorine increasing throughout a run but not at a constant 
rate. Affects of the contaminant on the chlorine would be difficult to distinguish from the actual 
water quality. None of the contaminants caused an increase in chlorine concentration but the fire 
foam and the highest concentration of Bug-B-Gon decreased the chlorine residual. The changes 
in chlorine residual was difficult to determine due to variation in the distribution system show in 
Figure 38.  
Figure 17 summarizes the change in pH responding to the different contaminants. As 
predicted, HFS, nitric acid, and hydrochloric acid, caused a decrease in pH. In addition, copper 
sulfate and Bug-B-Gon initiated a decrease in pH which were both unexpected. Exposure to 
sodium hydroxide produced an increase in pH due to the caustic nature of the contaminant. 
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The last column in Figure 18 shows the results of distilled water being injected into the 
system. Distilled water imposed a decrease of approximately 20 μs/cm. Similar changes can be 
seen with Bug-B-Gon, sodium fluoroacetate, Fire foam, paint thinner, carbon tetrachloride, and 
toluene because the stock solutions were prepared with distilled water. Additionally, the lowest 
concentration of copper sulfate had a decrease in conductivity.  The lowest concentration of 
hydrochloric acid stayed the same while the rest of the toxins increased the conductivity. Sodium 
fluoroacetate was predicted to increase in conductivity but decreased for both trials. The possible 
explanation is that the distilled water used to produce the stock solution counterbalanced the 
increase. Toluene and carbon tetrachloride were not predicted to influence the conductivity 
because the concentrations were in the ppb range.   
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Figure 15. Summary of Runs for the Hach Turbidity  
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Figure 16. Summary of Runs for the Hach Chlorine Analyzer  
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Figure 21. Summary of Runs for the Real UVT 
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
HFS Bug‐B‐Gone HNO3  CuSO4 HCl NaOH NaFC2H2O2 Fire Foam Paint 
Thinner
CCl4 Toluene
U
V
T
 
(
%
)
Baseline
N
o
 
D
a
t
a
 
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
N
o
 
D
a
t
a
 
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 73 
Figure 19 depicts the results of TOC changes due to the injected contaminants.  For the 
Hach TOC analyzer, the two higher concentrations of Bug-B-Gon, the highest concentration of 
sodium fluoroacetate, and both concentrations of fire foam caused increases in TOC. Sodium 
fluoroacetate, fire foam, and Bug-B-Gon were predicted to increase the TOC. Toluene and 
carbon tetrachloride were also predicted to increase the TOC but as mentioned before the 
concentration was too low. Paint thinner was predicted to increase the TOC because the 
contaminant is composed of saturated aliphatic and alicyclic hydrocarbons (C7 – C12) and 
aromatic hydrocarbons (C7 – C12) but did not change.  A possible explanation was the 
concentration was below the detection limits.  
Figure 20 shows the Sievers TOC outcomes. Similar to the Hach results, the two higher 
concentration of Bug-B-Gon, and both concentrations of fire foam caused an increase in TOC. 
The only difference was that data were not available for the sodium fluoroacetate, toluene and 
carbon tetrachloride runs because the instrument was not operational. Therefore detection is 
unknown for those runs. Similar results as the Hach TOC were projected.   
The changes in UVT due to the contaminants being pumped through the CWS are shown 
in Figure 21. Copper sulfate was the only contaminant that caused a significant change in 
transmittance. Fire foam and the highest concentration of Bug-B-Gon caused a slight deviation 
from the baseline but not significant enough to be labeled a detection. Because the UVT monitor 
detects the presence of NOM and aromatic organics, paint thinner and toluene should have been 
detected. Again, a possible reason was they were not within the detection limit of the instrument.   
The result from the agent identification from the parameters that deviated can be seen in 
Table 11. All the acid had the match of fluorosilicic acid, sarin, and mercuric chloride. The base, 
sodium hydroxide, did not produce an agent match. Copper sulfate had a similar response to the 
acids with the agent identification being fluorosilicic acid and mercuric chloride. Bug-B-Gon, 
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paint thinner, carbon tetrachloride, and toluene did not trigger a plant alarm. The Hach Agent 
library could not match sodium fluoroacetate but found multiple matches for fire foam. 
Dichlorvos, oxamyl, difenzoquate, dicotopho, and colchicine were all matches for fire foam.  
For the injection of HFS, the Hach Event Monitor designated the event as fluorosilicic 
acid, mercuric chloride, and sarin. Due to the injection of HFS, the water quality increased in pH 
and conductivity. The agent library was able to correctly identify the contaminant but also had 
two other possibilities. Mercuric chloride when added to water should only cause an increase in 
conductivity making it a probable match. Sarin introduced to a water supply is likely to increase 
the TOC, but should not affect pH or conductivity, making it an unlikely candidate for the 
contamination. Sarin is an unusual choice for events where only the pH and conductivity 
changed. Similar results occurred for hydrochloric and nitric acid.  
Copper sulfate was identified as fluorosilicic acid and mercuric chloride. The 
contaminant produced a pH decrease, and conductivity and turbidity increase once injected into 
the pilot monitoring system. Mercuric chloride is likely to increase conductivity and fluorosilicic 
acid has the potential to increase conductivity and decrease pH making both contaminants a 
possible candidate for the event. 
The fire foam had better matches than the fluorosilicic acid and copper sulfate but was 
not identified correctly. The contaminant was not predicted to be identified correctly because 
many different types of fire suppression foams are on the market and could have different results. 
Table 10 summarizes the possible matches for fire foam and the likely affects when added to a 
water source.  
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Table 10. Agent library results for fire foam injection and changes to water quality parameters 
Contaminants Chlorine pH Conductivity TOC 
Fire Foam ↓  ↓ ↑ 
Dichlorvos    ↑ 
Oxamyl  ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Dicrotophos ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Colchicine ↓ ↓  ↑ 
Notes: ↑ = increase 
↓ = decrease 
 
With the exception of conductivity, the parameters changed during the injection are 
similar to the characteristic of the four identified agents. Conductivity might have increased, but 
because it was mixed with distilled water, they balanced each other. The decrease in conductivity 
was about 6 μS/cm.             
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Table 11. Hach Agent Identification 
Contaminant  Agent Alarm 
Fluorosilicic Acid 
Sarin HFS 
Mercuric Chloride 
Fluorosilicic Acid 
Sarin HCl 
Mercuric Chloride 
Fluorosilicic Acid 
Sarin HNO3  
Mercuric Chloride 
NaOH  No Agent Alarm 
Fluorosilicic Acid 
CuSO4  Mercuric Chloride 
Sodium Fluoroacetate  No Agent Alarm 
Bug‐B‐Gon  No Plant Alarm 
Dichlorvos (Organo phosphate) 
Oxamyl (Carbamate) 
Difenzoquate (Herbicide) 
Dicotopho (Organo phospate) 
Fire Foam 
Colchicine (Poison) 
Paint Thinner  No Plant Alarm 
CCl4  No Plant Alarm 
Toluene  No Plant Alarm 
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4.2 BIOLOGICAL CHALLENGE EXPERIMENTS  
The JMAR Biosentry was used to detect microorganisms in the drinking water distribution 
system. To test the instrument, plastic spheres, E. coli, cryptosporidium, Giardia lamblia, and 
Bacillus atrophaeus spores were pumped through the pilot system to measure response.  
4.2.1 Baseline 
A baseline for the JMAR Biosentry needed to be established before the data could be analyzed. 
The deviation from the baseline would provide the count of microbes detected by the instrument 
during a run. As mentioned before, opening the valve to begin the injection process induces a 
large increase of turbidity and results in a significant increase in count per min for the Biosentry. 
Due to the increase of turbidity, the baseline average was taken before the valve was opened for 
a run.  A problem was encountered in the Spore and Rod shape readings. The spore and rod 
shape channels steadily increase throughout the day, which makes detection difficult shown in 
Figure 39. For this reason, baselines mean needs to be taken close to the initiation of pumping to 
ensure an accurate value.   
Figure 22 shows an average contamination event for spheres being injected. A spike 
occurred around 140 minutes, due to the valve and water being introduced into the pilot system.  
The second peak corresponds to the contamination event of 2µ spheres being injected into the 
water. The end of the baseline value will be the beginning of pumping (opening the valve). 
To determine the best average, five averages were calculated using the duration of 20, 30, 
40, 50, and 60 minutes before the opening of the valve. The value for the averages can be seen in 
Table 12. 
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Figure 22. Determination of baseline duration  
 
 
 
Table 12. Average values of count/ml for determination of a baseline before opening the valve 
Minutes before 
Pumping Average 
20 min 6.67 
30 min 6.26 
40 min 6.27 
50 min 6.1 
60 min 6.03 
 
 
The duration of 40 minutes before the beginning of pumping was chosen for the time 
taken to determine the baseline. The duration is long enough before the opening of the valve to 
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establish a beneficial baseline but not too long, that baseline is not similar as the actual 
contamination event.  The average for the five values in Table 11 was 6.27, which corresponds to 
40 minutes. Baseline values were calculated for each run performed.  
4.2.2 Detection Analysis for the Biosentry 
To determine the total count detected by the Biosentry a left Riemann’s sum was used 
which is shown in Equation 4. For the case of the Biosentry, data of intervals of one minute was 
taken for Δx.  
(Equation 4) xxfxxfxxfA n  )(...)()( 21  
 
The data were normalized by subtracting the baseline value from the value records by the 
instrument. Highlighted in Figure 23 was the increased count per min caused by injecting 2μm 
spheres. The area under the curve will provide the total count of spheres during the injection 
period.  Figure 24 is an enlarged graph of Figure 23. In addition, Figure 24 shows the left 
Riemann’s sum being applied to the curve.  
The area under the curve was calculated for each contamination event that created an 
increase in counts per minutes. The procedure was used for the rod, spore, protozoan shape, and 
unknown data.  
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Figure 23. Spheres Contamination Event with Baseline and Area Highlighted 
 
 
Figure 24. Left Riemann’s Sum Being Applied to Calculate the Total Number of Spheres  
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4.2.3 Conductivity 
All the microbes and spheres injected caused a decrease in conductivity which was detected by 
the Hach panel.  Distilled water was used to create the stock solution for all the biological 
contaminants. The distilled water verified the spheres and microbes being pumped through the 
system because it could be seen on the Hach panel as shown in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25. Change in conductivity due to distilled water 
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4.2.4 Contamination Events 
For each of the spheres and microbes injected, data were recorded and analyzed for the 
Biosentry. The Biosentry organizes the data into four different channels: 
 Rod- smallest particles (0.4 to 4 μm) 
 Spore- ovoid-shaped particles with more rigid walls/cases (1 to 3μm) 
 Protozoa- ovoid-shaped (3 to 10 μm) 
 Unknown 
The data from the Rod shape, spore shape, and protozoan shape counts were plotted against time 
to determine if an increase occurred.  
The summary of detection for the biological contaminants can be seen in Table 13.  The 
two-micron spheres were detected as protozoan shape at all four concentrations. This was 
predicted because the 2 μm spheres are supposed to represent protozoan microorganisms.  At 
concentrations of 2000 and 2500 spheres/mL, the Biosentry also classified the spheres as spore 
shapes. The large concentration could have caused disturbance in the readings and the size of the 
sphere also falls within the spore channel. The 0.8 micron spheres with a concentration of 200 
spheres/mL were not detected by the instrument but a concentration of 1000 and 2000 
spheres/mL were detected and both were classified as spore shape. As predicted, because 0.8 μm 
spheres are suppose to represent a contamination of spores.   
 A single concentration of cryptosporidium oocysts was injected into the pilot system. 
The pathogen caused an increase in count for the unknown, spore, and protozoan shapes. As 
classified by the manufacture, Table 4, cryptosporidium belongs in the protozoan channel. 
Therefore, an increase in unknown and spore counts was not projected. This could be due to the 
use of inactivated cryptosporidium instead of living oocysts.  
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 Giardia lamblia was injected into the system at a concentration of 100 colony forming 
units (CFU) per mL. The Biosentry recorded an increase in unknown and protozoan shape count. 
The protozoan was predicted to increase but not the unknown. Unknown could be related to 
turbidity or dead parasites.  
E coli were only detected at the highest concentration. For the highest concentration, 
4.66x106 CFU/mL, there was an increase count for unknown, rod, and spore shapes. Similar to 
the highest concentration, 2.74x106 CFU/mL was seen in the same channels and was also seen in 
the protozoan. According to the manufacture, the rod channel should have only increased. The 
system could have been bombarded with particles because the high concentration injected.   
  The Biosentry only detected Bacillus atrophaeus spores at a concentration of 660 
count/mL, which was anticipated.   
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Table 13. Contaminant Specific Monitoring for Biological Contaminants 
 Detection Category 
Contaminant Concentration Unknown Rod Spore Protozoan
200 
spheres/mL       X 
250 
spheres/mL       X 
2000 
spheres/mL     X X 
Plastic 
Sphere (2μ) 
2500 
spheres/mL     X X 
200 
spheres/mL         
200 
spheres/mL         
1000 
spheres/mL     X   
1000 
spheres/mL     X   
2000 
spheres/mL     X   
Plastic 
Sphere (0.8μ) 
2000 
spheres/mL     X   
Cryptosporidium 
oocysts 
200 
oocysts/mL X   X X 
Giardia lamblia 
cysts 100 CFU/mL X     X 
4.66x106 
CFU/mL X X X   
2.74x106 
CFU/mL X X X X 
80 CFU/mL         
E. coli cells 
 67 CFU/mL         
200 spores/mL         Bacillus 
Atrophaeus 
spores 660 spores/mL     X   
 
Notes:      
X = Detection by Instrument 
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Table 14 exhibits the summary of baseline values, maximum values, area under the 
curve, and percent recovery. Baseline values are the average count per minute 40 minutes before 
the opening of the valve. Maximum values are the peak number reached during the experiment. 
The numbers in the table are normalized by subtracting the baseline value. Area under the curve 
was calculated using a left Riemann’s sum.  Percent recovery was calculated by dividing the 
maximum values for each contaminant by the actual concentration. Counts per minute is 
equivalent to counts per milliliter because the Biosentry analysis one mL of water a minute. 
 Percent recovery ranged from 8% to 63%, excluding percent greater than 100. 
 For Giardia cysts, the infectious does is 25 to 100 cysts and the concentration injected 
was 100 CFU/mL. The concentration injected for cryptosporidium was 200 oocysts/mL and the 
infectious dose is 1 to 30 oocysts. The concentration detected for E. coli was greater than 
2.74x104 CFU/mL and the infectious does is between 106 and 109 organisms.  At the 
concentration injected for the three contaminants, only one to two mL of water would need to be 
ingested to be infected.   
 
Notes for Table 14: 
Unk = Unknown 
Spo = Spore 
Prot = Protozoan 
- = Undetected change in the Biosentry 
 
Table 14. Summary of Detection for the Biosentry 
  Baseline (counts/mL) Max Values (count/mL) Area (Count) % Recovery 
 Concentration Unk 
Ro
d Spo Prot Unk Rod Spo Prot Unk Rod Spo Prot Unk Rod Spo Prot 
200 spheres/mL -  -   - 6.5 -  -  - 18 -  -  - 242 -  -  - 9 
250 spheres/mL -  -   -  6 -  -   -  26 -  -   -  335 -  -   -  10  
2000 
spheres/mL -  -  325 6 -  -  207 213 -  -  3334 3319 -  -  10 11 
Sphere 
(2μm) 
2500 
spheres/mL -   375 5 -   192 289 -   3005 4124 -   8 12 
200 spheres/mL -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  
200 spheres/mL -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  
1000 
spheres/mL -  -  281  -  -  -  141  -  -  -  1968  -  -  -  14  -  
1000 
spheres/mL - - 281 - - - 151 - - - 2010 - - - 15 - 
2000 
spheres/mL -  -  411 - -  -  340  -  -  -  5033  -  -  -  17  -  
Sphere 
(0.8μm) 
2000 
spheres/mL -  -  1,092  -  -  -  465  -  -  -  5539  -  -  -  23  -  
Crypto-
sporidium 200 oocyst/mL 7,790  -  202 9 950  -  125 21 14,829  -  2254 545 475  -  63 11 
Giardia 
lamblia 100 CFU/mL 5,350  -   -  4.5 554  -   -  18 4,495  -   -  197 554  -   -  15 
4.66x106 
CFU/mL 5600 377 170  -  24,612 5,788 1093 3x105  -  71,889 12,702  -  0.53 0.12 0.02  -  
2.74x106 
CFU/mL 4300 296 150 8 4490 877 75 17 81,774 13,521 1170 105 0.16 0.03 0.00   
80 CFU/mL -  -   -   -  -  -   -  -  -  -   -   -  -  -  -   -  
E. coli  
67 cfu/ml -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -  -   -  -  -   -   - 
200spores/mL -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -   - Bacillus 
Atrophaeu 660 spores/mL -  -  103  -  -  -  80  -  -  -  1010  -  -  -  15  -  
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For each of the spheres and microbes injected, data was recorded and analyzed from the 
Biosentry. The data from the Rod shape, spore shape, and protozoan shape counts were plotted 
against time to determine if an increase occurred. Figure 26 and Figure 27 demonstrate raw data 
for the injection of 0.8μm spheres and cryptosporidium.  
The spore shape count increased as a result of 0.8μm spheres being injected into the pilot 
system seen in Figure 26.  From the baseline, the count increased by 151 count per minute. The 
area under the curve was 2100 spore shaped ‘organisms’. Five million spheres were injected for 
analysis. The instrument detected 0.04% of the total amount injected.  
Figure 27 was the increase of protozoan shapes as a result of cryptosporidium being 
injected into the CWS. The theoretical concentration of organisms in the effluent was 200 
oocysts per ml, which caused an increase of 21 protozoan shaped organisms. The total number 
under the curves was 545 oocysts. Compared to the one million injected, only 0.05% was 
detected by the protozoan channel. For this run, the unknown and spore shapes also increased. 
The total number of organisms detected by the Biosentry was 1.8%.  
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Figure 26. Increase in Spore concentration as a result of 0.8μm spores 
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Figure 27. Increase in Protozoan concentration as a result of Cryptosporidium
 90 
The data from the unknown, rod shape, spore shape, and protozoan shape counts was 
summarized by sorting the information into bar graphs.  Figures 28 to 31 show each detection 
category in the Biosentry. 
Figure 28 summarizes the unknown results from all the experiments when the optical 
pattern could not be matched to a pattern in the library. The E. coli at two higher concentrations 
significantly increased the unknown count. Cryptosporidium and Giardia also increase the 
unknown count for the Biosentry. None of the other contaminants had an impact on the count.  
Figure 29 shows the detection of organisms in the rod shape category. The two higher 
concentrations of E. coli caused an increase in the rod shape count. This was predicted because 
E. coli is one of the known patterns in the detection library and it is classified as a rod shape. 
None of the other contaminants caused an increase in count.  
Figure 30 shows the changes in spore count. The spore count did not change for the 200 
to 250 count per ml for the 0.8μm and 2μm plastic spheres and Bacillus spores. All the other 
contaminants had an increase in spore count other than the lower concentrations of E. coli and 
Giardia. The 0.8μm spheres and Bacillus spores are the only contaminants that should have 
increased the spore count.  
Figure 31 shows the results for the impact of the contaminants on the protozoan count. 
All the 2μm spheres caused an increase in the protozoan count. The 0.8μm spheres did not 
increase the protozoan count during the experiments as anticipated. Cryptosporidium, Giardia, 
and E. coli, at a concentration of 2.74 million cfu/ml, had an increase in protozoan count. An 
increase should have occurred for the 2 μm spheres, Cryptosporidium oocysts, and Giardia cysts 
but not the E. coli cells.   
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Figure 28. Unknown Biosentry Results 
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 Figure 30. Spore Biosentry Results 
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 Figure 31. Protozoan Biosentry Results
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The injected chemical contaminants did not have an impact on the Biosentry. There were 
no noticeable changes in the instrument during the chemical injection. The Biosentry did 
increase in count for all of the channels when the valve to the injection system was opened. This 
is the result of an increase of turbidity through the system.  
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4.3 CHEMICAL CONTAMINANT SPECIFIC MONITORING – GC-MS 
The gas chromatography-mass spectrometry was tested by injecting paint thinner, toluene and 
carbon tetrachloride in the pilot system.  Every 15 minutes a sample was taken for analysis. The 
instrument records a concentration of contaminants but it is based on the library calibration.  
To quantify the concentration detected average chloroform concentration at the drinking 
water plant was compared to recorded values by the GC-MS. Table 15 summarizes the 
concentration of chloroform detected by the GC-MS during the each of the experiments. The 
average value of chloroform was divided by the GC-MS value of chloroform to produce a scalar. 
The concentration of contaminants quantified by the GC-MS is then multiplied by the scalar. 
  
Table 15. Concentration Scalar Based on Average Chloroform Concentration 
 
GC-MS 
Chloroform 
Concentration 
(ppb) 
Actual Ave. 
Chloroform 
Concentration (ppb)
Scalar 
11.37 9 0.792 Paint 
Thinner 18.65 9 0.483 
2.536 9 3.549 CCl4 
2.078 9 4.331 
2.369 9 3.799 Toluene 
2.352 9 3.827 
 
The drinking water normally has low concentrations of disinfection byproducts (DBPs). 
For Pittsburgh water, the common byproducts are chloroform (CHCl3), bromodichloromethane 
(CHBrCl2), dibromochloromethane (CHBR2Cl), and bromoform (CHBr3) which are all 
trihalomethanes.  
4.3.1 Paint thinner 
Paint thinner was injected into the pilot system at calculated effluent concentrations of 20 
and 200 mg/l . Concentration of 20 mg/l was not detected by the GC-MS, but the 200 mg/l was 
detected. Figure 32 shows the baseline of the water quality for the day that the paint thinner was 
injected. The four peaks correspond to the four DBPs mentioned above. Figure 33 shows the 
detection of paint thinner in the water. The multiple peaks are a result of the many organics 
within the injected solution.  
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Figure 32. Baseline Values for the GC-MS before Paint Thinner was Injected 
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 Figure 33. Detection of Paint Thinner by the GC-MS 
 
4.3.2 Carbon Tetrachloride 
Concentrations of 86 and 62 μg/l carbon tetrachloride were injected into the pilot system. 
Both runs were detected by the GC-MS. Figure 34 shows the baseline values before carbon 
tetrachloride was injected into the pilot system. The four peaks represent the four DBPs in the 
drinking water.  Figure 35 shows the detection of carbon tetrachloride by the GC-MS. The peak 
occurs between chloroform and bromodichloromethane.  
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 Figure 34. Baseline Values for the GC-MS before Carbon tetrachloride was Injected 
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Figure 35. Detection of Carbon Tetrachloride 86 μg/L by the GC-MS 
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The concentrations detected by the GC-MS for the two runs were 9.9 and 1.8 ppb. The 
number was estimated based on the concentration of chloroform detected by the instrument, as 
represented in Table 16. The percent difference is the absolute value of the theoretical effluent 
concentration minus the MC-MS concentration that quantity divided by the theoretical 
concentration. Table 16 shows the data for the two runs of carbon tetrachloride.  Neither of the 
estimated values was close to the calculated value. Accurate results were not predicted because 
the instrument was not calibrated for carbon tetrachloride. During an actual contamination event, 
the contaminant will be unknown and the GC-MS would not be properly calibrated for the 
detected contaminant.  
 
Table 16. Concentration of Detected Carbon Tetrachloride 
Theoretical Effluent 
Concentration (ppb) 
GC-MS CCl4 
Concentration (ppb)
Scaled 
Concentration (ppb) 
% 
Difference
86 9.879 35.060 40.77% 
62 1.792 7.761 87.48% 
 
 
4.3.3 Toluene 
Toluene was injected into the pilot system with effluent concentrations of 9 and 48 μg/l. 
The baseline conditions for the distribution water before toluene was injected can be seen in 
Figure 36. The GC-MS detected both concentrations of toluene. Figure 37 shows the detection of 
48 μg/l of toluene and the peak occurs between bromodichloromethane and 
dibromochloromethane.  
 
 Figure 36. Baseline Values for the GC-MS before Toluene was Injected 
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Figure 37. Detection of Toluene  48 μg/L by the GC-MS 
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Table 17 compares the theoretical effluent concentration to the scaled concentration 
detected by the GC-MS. The higher concentration of toluene was close to the estimated value but 
the lower concentration was not close.  As mentioned before, the GC-MS was not calibrated for 
toluene because during an actual event the instrument would not be calibrated.  
 
Table 17. Concentration of Detected Toluene 
Theoretical Effluent 
Concentration (ppb) 
GC-MS Toluene 
Concentration (ppb) 
Scaled Concentration 
(ppb) 
% 
Difference
48 17.45 66.294 38.11% 
9 0.5076 1.942 78.42% 
 
 
 
From Table 16 and Table 17 the comparisons of the theoretical concentrations to the 
scaled concentrations were not similar. Therefore, the GC-MS should be used more as a 
qualitative instrument instead of quantifying the concentration detected for the CWS because 
calibration is impossible for unknown contaminants during an event. Lab analysis with a 
calibrated GC-MS would be able to give a more accurate concentration of hydrocarbons. The 
GC-MS for the field is more for detection and classification of possible contaminants.   
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4.4 REAL-TIME TOXICITY BIOMONITORING 
Chemical parameters in a continuous monitoring system utilize TOC, pH, chlorine, 
conductivity, temperature, and turbidity to detect changes in the water, but these parameters 
cannot report the toxic effects associated with the combination of chemicals. Biomonitoring 
systems detect changes in the in behavioral and physiological responses of aquatic organisms 
and provide rapid detection and continuous real time monitoring. 
Biomonitors are sensitive to toxicity associated with an expansive array of organic and 
inorganic compounds. They provide near real-time evidence of the presence of toxins through 
their biological reactions to the water supply. The major disadvantage of biological systems are 
that they do not specify the contaminant, only that the water could be harmful and can respond to 
water conditions not harmful to humans. Also, a major issue with biomonitors are that chlorine is 
toxic to aquatic life. Therefore, finished water needs to be dechlorinated before flowing to the 
aquatic life.  
To dechlorinate the water, Sodium thiosulfate was added to distribution water before 
flowing through the fish chambers. Daily variations of chorine create difficulties for proper 
dosing of the dechlorinator. Therefore, the fish reacted to changes in concentration of chlorine.  
The following contaminants were injected into the water to evaluate the detection 
possibilities of the biomonitor: 
Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) Sodium Fluoroacetate(NaFC2H2O2) 
Nitric Acid (HNO3) Bug-B-Gon 
Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Fire Suppression Foam 
Hydrofluosilic Acid (H2SiF6) Paint Thinner 
Copper Sulfate (CuSO4) Toluene (C6H5CH3) 
E. coli Carbon Tetrachloride(CCl4) 
Cryptosporidium Bacillus Atrophaeus 
 Giardia lamblia 
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The fish monitor did not produce a warning for the biological contaminants (E. coli, 
Cryptosporidium, Bacillus, and Giardia). A possible reason that the fish did not respond to the 
bacteria is that fish are accustom to living with biological contaminants in the wild. The 
summary of the fish response to the injected chemical toxins can be seen in Table 18.   
For HFS, the fish did not react to the toxin. The LD50 for trout was greater than the 
concentration of contaminant in the water. In addition, the dechlorinator neutralized the pH, 
therefore a pH drop did not occur in the fish monitor.  This was verified by a sample taken from 
the effluent of the fish monitor and the pH measured with a handheld pH meter.   
HCl is slightly toxic to fish. The injected acid caused a pH decrease of 1.1 to 1.5 on the 
distribution water.  The fish sensor did alarm 4 hours after the contaminant was injected into the 
pilot system. Other factors could have influenced the fish going into alarm; therefore a non-
detect was designated for the acid. For the other two runs, the behaviors of the fish were 
unaltered.  
The nitric acid experiments initiated a 1.5 to 2.5 decrease in pH. Two runs of a 1.5 pH 
decrease were performed and neither had an effect on the fish. The third caused at least six of the 
eight fish to go into warning, thus triggering the alarm. The fish possibly reacted to the change in 
pH rather than the increase in nitric acid. This was the only run that had a pH drop this large.  
The fish did not detect the presence of sodium hydroxide in the distribution water. The 
concentration in the water exceeded the LD50 for fish but the fish did not go into alarm. Sodium 
hydroxide is only moderately toxic to aquatic life and maybe the duration was not long enough to 
have major effects on the fish behavior.  
Copper sulfate is extremely toxic to fish and for the three concentrations the fish went 
into alarm. A concentration of 8.1 mg/l triggered an alarm less than an hour after the toxin was 
injected into the pilot system. For the concentrations of 15.5 and 11 mg/l of copper sulfate, the 
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alarm for the biomonitor was triggered one hour after injecting a contaminant. The three 
concentrations exceeded the LC50 of 0.1 mg/L.  
Fire foam, sodium fluoroacetate, and paint thinner were not detected by the fish monitor. 
In addition, the fish did not go into alarm for either toluene or carbon tetrachloride. The 
concentration of the toxins in the water was below the LD50 for the substances. 
The Bug-B-Gon at concentrations of 11.5 and 57.5 μg/l were not detected by the fish 
monitor. For the two high concentrations, the biosensor did not alarm during the experiment. 
Data for the time after water was injected through the monitor was not available. The fish should 
have gone into alarm because the concentration of bifenthrin, which is highly toxic to aquatic 
life, exceeded the LD50 for fish. 
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Table 18. Chemical, Lethal Concentration, Concentration Feed and Fish Response 
Chemical Toxic to Fish LD50 (fish) 
Concentration 
Feed 
Fish 
Detection 
7 mg/L F- for 48 min   
7 mg/L F- for 30 min   
9.77 mg/L F- for 46 min   
HFS Moderately  
96 hr LC50    (Salmo 
gairdneri) =  51 mg/L 
[CSBP, 2005] 
6.6 mg/L F- for 30 min   
 1.5 pH decrease   HCl Slightly 
96 hr LC50 (Bluegill) 
pH 3.0 to 3.5 [Fisher 
Scientific, 2000] 1.5 pH decrease    
 2.1 pH decrease X 
1.5 pH decrease    HNO3 Slightly 
5 hr LCL 750 mg/L  
[Terra, 2006] 
1.5 pH decrease    
250 mg/L for 30 min   NaOH Moderately  43 mg/L for 96 hr [TCI, 2008] 440 mg/L for 30 min   
8.1 mg/L for 32 min X 
15.5 mg/L for 33 min X CuSO4 Highly  
96 hr LC50 
(Goldfish) 0.1 mg/L 
[J.T. Baker, 2008]  11 mg/L for 36 min X 
0.5 mg/L for 30 min   Sodium 
Fluoroacetate Low n/a 5 mg/L for 30 min   
11.5 μg/L   
57.5 μg/L   
115 μg/L   
Bug-G-Gone 
(Bifenthrin) Highly  
0.0038 - 17.8 μg/L 
[Scotts, 2001] 
230 μg/L   
10 μg/L for 30 min   Fire Foam Moderately 96 hr LC50 (Rainbow Trout) 28 mg/L [Kidde 
Fire Fighting, 2007] 30 μg/L for 30 min   
20 mg/L for 22 min   Paint Thinner 
  
n/a 
50 mg/L for 42 min   
49 μg/L for 30 min   Toluene Moderately  
96 hr LC50 10 to 100 
mg/L 
 [J.T. Baker, 2007] 9 μg/L for 30 min   
86 μg/L for 30 min   Carbon Tetrachloride Moderately  
96 hr LC50 (Fathead 
Minnow) 43.1 mg/L 
[Matheson Tri-Gas, 
2004] 62 μg/L for 30 min   
Notes:  
X = 6 out of the 8 fish went into warning 
n/a = information is not available 
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5.0  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The pilot Contamination Warning System was used to help detect accidental or 
intentional contamination in the drinking water distribution. The pilot was set up within the 
actual distribution system which was connected to main transmission lines that feed downtown 
Pittsburgh. To help detect changes in the water various technologies were used. The instruments 
included chemical and biological monitors: 
 Hach Distribution Panel; 
 Sievers 900 Online TOC Analyzer; 
 Online GC-MS; 
 JMAR Biosentry Pathogen Identification System; 
 Biosensor Fish Monitor; and 
 Real UVT 254 Online Monitor. 
To test the instruments, contaminants relating to accidental and intentional contamination 
were injected into the pilot. The toxins include: 
Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) Sodium Fluoroacetate(NaFC2H2O2) 
Nitric Acid (HNO3) Bug-B-Gone 
Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Fire Suppression Foam 
Hydrofluosilic Acid (H2SiF6) Paint Thinner 
Copper Sulfate (CuSO4) Toluene (C6H5CH3) 
Plastic Spheres Carbon Tetrachloride(CCl4) 
E. coli Bacillus Atrophaeus 
Cryptosporidium Giardia lamblia 
 
Data were collected for each run, and then analyzed. The summary of each instrument’s 
response to the different contaminants injected can be seen in Table 19. Each instrument 
responded to at least one toxin.   
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Table 19. Contaminant and Response 
 
Contaminant Concentration Hach Panel
Real 
Tech 
UVT 
Sievers 
TOC 
JMAR 
Biosentry
INFICON 
HAPSITE 
GC-MS 
Biosensor 
Fish 
Monitor 
Hydrofluosilicic 
Acid 
6.6 to 9.8 
mg/l F- X           
Hydrochloric 
Acid 
1.1 and 1.5 
pH drop X           
Nitric Acid  1.5 and 2.1 pH drop X           
Sodium 
Hydroxide 
1 and 1.2 pH 
increase X           
Copper Sulfate 8.1 to 15.5 mg/l X X       X 
Fire Suppression 
Foam 
0.001% and 
0.003% X   X       
Sodium 
Fluoroacetate 
0.5 and 5 
mg/l X    n/a       
Bug-B-Gon 100 to 200 mg/l    X       
Paint Thinner 100 mg/l         X   
Toluene 9 and 48 μg/l     n/a   X   
Carbon 
Tetrachloride 
62 and 86 
μg/l     n/a   X   
E. coli 
2.74x106 and 
4.66x106 
cfu/ml 
      X     
Cryptosporidium 200 crypto/ml X     X     
Bacillus 
Atrophaeus 660 count/ml       X     
Giardia lamblia 100 cfu/ml X     X     
Spheres (0.8μ 
and 2μ) 
200 to 2500 
spheres/ml 
      X     
 
Note:        
X = Detection by Instrument 
n/a = Data Not Available       
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5.1 HACH GUARDIAN BLUE 
The instruments detected change in water quality and triggered an alarm for all the chemicals 
with the exception of Bug-B-Gon, paint thinner, toluene, and carbon tetrachloride.  The 
concentrations of toluene and carbon tetrachloride were in the ppb range, which did not cause 
changes in the water quality parameters (i.e. chlorine concentration, pH, TOC, turbidity, and 
conductivity). For the biological contaminants, cryptosporidium and Giardia triggered an alarm 
because of an increase of TOC. The inactivation agent, formalin, used for the pathogens, 
explains the increase in TOC.  
Hach Guardian Blue System attempted to identify contaminants for five of the seven 
detected chemicals. Only Fluorosilicic was identified correctly. In addition, HFS was also 
identified as sarin and mercuric chloride by the agent library. The same identification transpired 
for each contaminant that had a pH change. HFS, when introduced into the distribution water, 
produced an increase in pH and conductivity, which was predicted. The agent library correctly 
identified the substance as fluorosilicic acid but also identified sarin and mercuric chloride. 
According to WCIT, water tainted with sarin is likely to increase the TOC but is unlikely to 
affect pH and conductivity. This is an unusual match for HFS because only pH and conductivity 
were matches. TOC for the injection run was unaffected. Mercuric chloride was also identified as 
a possible match. When introduced into a water supply, mercuric chloride will commonly 
increase the conductivity but not alter the pH. This is a more reasonable match to HFS than 
mercuric chloride because at least one of the parameters was predicted to change coincides with 
the actual run.  
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Hydrochloric and nitric acids had the same response as HFS when injected in the pilot 
system. Therefore, the agent identification was the same. The pH and conductivity increases 
were predicted changes for the two contaminants.  
The results for the Agent identification system are erroneous. Some of the results could 
be possible but others are not even close. Sarin had none of the same indicators as HFS but was a 
possible match. The system might be better off without the agent detection. To identify 
contaminants based only on the five water quality parameters would be difficult because 
combination of chemicals would alter the identification results.  
 Beneficial detection methods for the Hach Guardian Blue System were conductivity and 
turbidity. A disruption within a system will produce an increase in turbidity. Increase in turbidity 
not related to a known water main breaks or routine repairs could possibly be an indicator of a 
contamination event.   In addition, conductivity changed for all the contaminants injected. The 
change was small but a peak in a system with relatively stable baseline conditions could be an 
indication of a contamination event. These two instruments had little to no maintenance 
problems during the research.  
The chlorine analyzer was difficult to detect changes. Figure 38 shows the monthly 
variation from the free chlorine monitor. Water quality was constantly changing as a result of 
source water quality, variations in the treatment process, variation in hydraulic conditions in the 
distribution system, accidental back siphonage and water main breaks. In Pittsburgh, some of the 
chlorine variation is related to the booster stations. The method is not precise thus having daily 
variations. The instrument itself, worked properly and had little maintenance problems but 
created many false alarms.  
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Figure 38. Chlorine variations for a Duration of One Month 
 
The TOC analyzer produced the majority of the problem for the Hach Distribution panel.   
The instrument malfunctioned often and required a great deal of maintenance.  It was difficult to 
maintain a constant flow through the TOC analyzer, which produced inaccurate readings. The 
purge gas generator is loud and bulky and initially we had problems with the connection of the 
air generator to the analyzer. Overall, the footprint of the system is large, had many maintenance 
problems and compared to the Sievers TOC the results were less accurate.  
One advantage is that the Event monitor contains all the data for each instrument and is 
very easy to use. Data can be easily retrieved via a UBS port. The exported data were easily 
downloaded into a spreadsheet.  In addition, this instrument detects the widest range of 
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contaminants. For the instrument to be better, I would remove the Agent Identification system 
and install a better TOC analyzer.   
5.2 SIEVERS TOC 
. Unlike, the Hach TOC analyzer, the Sievers TOC analyzer worked very well for all the studies 
performed. Bug-B-Gon, paint thinner, and fire foam were predicted to increase the TOC. A TOC 
increase was detected for fire foam and Bug-B-Gon but not the paint thinner. A possible 
explanation was that the concentration was not large enough for the contaminant to be detected. 
Near the end of the research, routine maintenance caused erroneous readings. Therefore, data are 
not available for sodium fluoroacetate, toluene and carbon tetrachloride. Little maintenance was 
required and the monitor gave accurate readings. The system operated soundly for one year with 
just only minor problems near the end of the study.  The ideal situation would be that the Sievers 
TOC replaces the Hach TOC in the HACH Guardian Blue. The system is much smaller than the 
Hach and produced more accurate results.  
5.3 REAL TECH UVT 
The detection limit for the instrument is within the ppm range therefore, concentrations in the 
ppb range were not detected. Modifications can be made by the company to increase the 
sensitivity of the instrument and detect in the ppb range. The Real UVT was easy to maintain. A 
calibration does need to be performed regularly or the baseline value will drift.  Calibrating the 
instrument is easy and only requires pure water to be pushed through the monitor. For the 
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research, the UVT only detected copper sulfate. The aromatic hydrocarbon toluene was injected 
at too low of a concentration to be detected by the UVT. The instrument is limited in the 
detection capabilities and should be used in conjunction with other monitoring devices.   
5.4 JMAR BIOSENTRY 
The biosentry detected all the biological contaminants injected except for the 200 spheres/ml of 
the 0.8μm spheres, 200 spores/ml Bacillus atrophaeus, and the two lower concentrations of E. 
coli. For the detected pathogens, the percent recovery was mediocre. The total count detected by 
the JMAR was not close to the concentration injected and for the concentration injected, one 
would only have to consume one to two ml to receive the infectious dose. The greatest percent of 
detected pathogens was Giardia. Only 0.5% of the total concentration injected was detected.  
Detection at the 200 count/ml did not occur for the spore and rod channel. Therefore, not being 
an effective tool for spore and rod microbial that have a low effective dose.  
 One of the main problems is turbidity in the water.  An unstable baseline, which made 
interpreting data difficult, was due to natural changes of turbidity in the distribution water. The 
system would be more accurate if the water was considerably less turbid. Figure 39 shows the 
daily variation for the Bacillus injection. The baseline slightly increases throughout the day until 
700 minutes (midnight) where the system goes through self-cleaning. The actual contamination 
event is difficult to distinguish from naturally occurring variance.  For the system to be more 
useful, detection at a lower concentration is necessary to prevent the consuming population from 
becoming ill.  
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Figure 39. Daily variation of spore count for the Bacillus run 
5.5 INFICON HAPSITE GC-MS 
No problems were experienced during the study for the CG-MS. Toluene, paint thinner, and 
carbon tetrachloride were injected into the water for analysis. The instrument detected them all 
and worked seamlessly.  But, the online GC-MS should be used more qualitatively than 
analyzing the concentration because the instrument will not be calibrated during an event. The 
contaminant during an event will most likely be unknown and proper calibration impossible. 
Therefore, the instrument should be used more for detection and classification instead of 
concentration.  A disadvantage is that the instrument is expensive. Therefore, having multiple 
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GC-MS throughout the distribution system would be difficult in terms of cost. Out of the six 
instrument used for this study, this was the best instrument. It detected all the predicted 
chemicals and had little maintenance problems. An issue is the limited number of contaminants 
that can be detected and should be used with other monitoring instruments. 
5.6 BIOSENSOR FISH MONITOR 
The fish only detected the presence of copper sulfate in the water. The instrument was very 
difficult to maintain. The fish had to be checked, replaced in the monitor, or the baseline had to 
be recalibrated on a daily basis. For monitoring purposes, a positive alarm was hard to 
distinguish. Alarms for some of the contaminants would occur hours after the contaminant was 
injected and there could be multiple reasons for the alarm therefore a non-detect would be issued 
for the toxin.   
Fluctuations of chlorine residual in the distribution system made it difficult to 
dechlorinate the water before flowing through the fish chamber. Chlorine is highly toxic to fish 
and excessive chlorine can affect the monitoring data.  The pump for the dechlorinator 
malfunctioned often and it was hard to tell if sodium thiosulfate was actually being pumped into 
the monitor. In addition, the flow through instrument was never consistent and fluctuation 
transpired daily. In general, the instrument may better serve intake water than distribution water. 
This was the most difficult of the instruments to maintain and the results were difficult to 
interpret. I would not include this system within a CWS.  
At least one of the monitors used detected each contaminant injected. In general, the pilot 
CWS worked well but required a great deal of maintenance.  Natural variations in water quality 
would cause false alarms by the monitors. To decrease the false alarms, an appropriate range of 
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safe concentrations needs to be determined before the start of a CWS.  In addition, multiple 
systems would be needed throughout the distribution system because a contamination event 
could occur downstream or another part of the system. If that were to happen, the system would 
not detect or alert changes in the water, therefore making it ineffective. The CWS showed 
realistic results of performance in an actual distribution system. The research provided valuable 
data for the development of an accurate monitoring system to protect against contamination 
events.  
 
APPENDIX A 
CHEMICAL CONTAMINANTS 
A.1 FLUOROSILICIC ACID 
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Figure 40. HFS Trigger Graph for 6.60 ppm F- 
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Figure 41. HFS Turbidity Graph for 6.60 ppm F- 
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Figure 42. HFS Chlorine Graph for 6.60 ppm F- 
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Figure 43. HFS pH Graph for 6.60 ppm F- 
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Figure 44. HFS Conductivity Graph for 6.6 ppm F- 
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Figure 45. HFS Conductivity Graph for 6.6o ppm F- 
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 A.2 HYDROCHLORIC ACID 
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Figure 46. HCl Trigger Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 47. HCl Turbidity Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 48. HCl Chlorine Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 49. HCl pH Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 50. HCl Conductivity Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 51. HCl TOC Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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 A.3 NITRIC ACID 
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Figure 52. HNO3 Trigger Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 53. HNO3 Turbidity Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 54. HNO3 Chlorine Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 55. HNO3 pH Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
460
462
464
466
468
470
472
474
476
478
480
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
C
on
du
ct
iv
ity
 (μ
S/
cm
)
Time (minutes)
Conductivity, HNO3 (October 23, 2008)
0
Concentration = 1.5 pH Decrease
Stop Pumping AcidBegin Pumping Acid
 
Figure 56. HNO3 Conductivity Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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Figure 57. HNO3 TOC Graph for 1.5 pH Decrease 
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 A.4 SODIUM HYDROXIDE  
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Figure 58. NaOH Trigger Graph for 1.2 pH Decrease 
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Figure 59. NaOH Turbidity Graph for 1.2 pH Decrease 
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Figure 60. NaOH Chlorine Graph for 1.2 pH Decrease 
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Figure 61. NaOH pH Graph for 1.2 pH Decrease 
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Figure 62. NaOH Conductivity Graph for 1.2 pH Decrease 
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Figure 63. NaOH TOC Graph for 1.2 pH Decrease 
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 A.5 COPPER SULFATE 
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Figure 64. CuSO4 Trigger Graph for 11 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 65. CuSO4 Turbidity Graph for 11 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 66. CuSO4 Chlorine Graph for 11 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 67. CuSO4 pH Graph for 11 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 68. CuSO4 Conductivity Graph for 11 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 69. CuSO4 TOC Graph for 11 ppm Concentration 
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 A.6 SODIUM FLUOROACETATE 
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Figure 70. Sodium Fluoroacetate Trigger Graph for 5 ppm Concentration  
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Figure 71. Sodium Fluoroacetate Turbidity Graph for 5 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 72. Sodium Fluoroacetate Chlorine Graph for 5 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 73. Sodium Fluoroacetate pH Graph for 5 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 74. Sodium Fluoroacetate Conductivity Graph for 5 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 75. Sodium Fluoroacetate TOC Graph for 5 ppm Concentration 
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 A.7 BUG-B-GON 
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Figure 76. Bug-B-Gon Trigger Graph for 200 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 77. Bug-B-Gon Turbidity Graph for 200 ppm Concentration 
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
C
hl
or
in
e 
(p
pm
)
Time (minutes)
Chlorine, Bug‐B‐Gon  (May 12, 2008)
0
Effluent Concentration = 200 ppm
Begin Pumping Bug‐B‐Gon  Stop Pumping Bug‐B‐Gon 
 
Figure 78. Bug-B-Gon Chlorine Graph for 200 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 79. Bug-B-Gon pH Graph for 200 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 80. Bug-B-Gon Conductivity Graph for 200 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 81. Bug-B-Gon TOC Graph for 200 ppm Concentration 
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 A.8 FIRE FOAM 
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Figure 82. Fire Foam Trigger Graph for 0.003% Concentration  
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Figure 83. Fire Foam Turbidity Graph for 0.003% Concentration 
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Figure 84. Fire Foam Chlorine Graph for 0.003% Concentration 
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Figure 85. Fire Foam pH Graph for 0.003% Concentration 
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Figure 86. Fire Foam Conductivity Graph for 0.003% Concentration 
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Figure 87. Fire Foam TOC Graph for 0.003% Concentration 
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 A.9 PAINT THINNER  
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Figure 88. Paint Thinner Trigger Graph for 100 ppm Concentration  
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Figure 89. Paint Thinner Turbidity Graph for 100 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 90. Paint Thinner Chlorine Graph for 100 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 91. Paint Thinner pH Graph for 100 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 92. Paint Thinner Conductivity Graph for 100 ppm Concentration 
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Figure 93. Paint Thinner TOC Graph for 100 ppm Concentration 
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APPENDIX B 
BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINANT 
B.1 TWO ΜICRON SPHERES 
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Figure 94. 2μ Spheres Unknown Graph for 2000 spheres/ml 
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Figure 95. 2μ Spheres Rod Graph for 2000 spheres/ml 
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Figure 96. 2μ Spheres Spore Graph for 2000 spheres/ml 
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Figure 97. 2μ Spheres Protozoa Graph for 2000 spheres/ml 
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 B.2 0.8 MICRON SPHERES 
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Figure 98. 0.8μ Spheres Unknown Graph for 2000 spheres/ml 
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Figure 99. 0.8μ Spheres Rod Graph for 2000 spheres/ml 
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Figure 100. 0.8μ Spheres Spore Graph for 2000 spheres/ml 
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Figure 101. 0.8μ Spheres Protozoan Graph for 2000 spheres/ml 
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 B.3 CRYPTOSPORIDIUM 
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Figure 102. Cryptosporidium Unknown Graph for 200 crypto/ml 
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Figure 103. Cryptosporidium Rod Graph for 200 crypto/ml 
150
170
190
210
230
250
270
290
310
330
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Sp
or
e 
Sh
ap
e 
(c
ou
nt
/m
in
)
Time (minutes)
Spore Shape, Cryptosporidium (August 29, 2008)
Concentration = 200 count/mL
Begin Pumping Crypto Stop Pumping Crypto
Baseline
 
Figure 104. Cryptosporidium Spore Graph for 200 crypto/ml 
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Figure 105. Cryptosporidium Protozoan Graph for 200 crypto/ml 
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 B.4 GIARDIA LAMBLIA 
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Figure 106. Giardia lamblia Unknown Graph for 100 cfu/ml 
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Figure 107. Giardia lamblia Rod Graph for 100 cfu/ml 
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Figure 108. Giardia lamblia Spore Graph for 100 cfu/ml 
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Figure 109. Giardia lamblia Protozoan Graph for 100 cfu/ml 
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 B.5 ESCHERICHIA COLI 
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Figure 110. Escherichia coli Unknown Graph for 2.74 x106 cfu/ml 
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Figure 111. Escherichia coli Rod Graph for 2.74 x106 cfu/ml 
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 8
Sp
or
e 
Sh
ap
e 
(c
ou
nt
s/
m
in
)
Time (minutes)
Spore Shape, E. coli (September 23, 2008)
0
Concentration = 2.74 x 106 cfu/ml
Begin Pumping E. coli Stop Pumping E. coli
Baseline
 
Figure 112. Escherichia coli Spore Graph for 2.74 x106 cfu/ml 
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Figure 113. Escherichia coli Protozoan Graph for 2.74 x106 cfu/ml 
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 B.6 BACILLUS ATROPHAEUS 
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Figure 114. Bacillus atropaeus Unknown Graph for 660 count/ml 
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Figure 115. Bacillus atropaeus Rod Graph for 660 count/ml 
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Figure 116. Bacillus atropaeus Spore Graph for 660 count/ml 
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Figure 117. Bacillus atropaeus Protozoan Graph for 660 count/ml 
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ABBREVIATIONS  
AMSDIS Automated Mass Spectral 
Deconvolution and 
Identification System 
 HSPD-9 Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 9 
CAS Chemical Abstract Service  kg kilograms 
cfu Colony Forming Units  L Liter 
CWS Contamination Warning 
System 
 LC50 Lethal concentration where 
50 percent of the test 
population dies 
DBPs Disinfection by-products  LD50 Lethal Dose where 50 
percent of the test 
population dies 
DI De-ionized   MALS Multi-Angle Light 
Scattering 
DO Dissolved oxygen   MCL Maximum contamination 
level 
DPD N, N-diethyl-p-
phenylenediamine 
 mg Milligram 
DSS Distribution system 
simulator 
 mgd Million gallons per day 
EHEC Enterohemorrhagic E. coli   min Minute 
EIEC Enteroinvasive E. coli  ml milliliter 
EPEC Enteropathogenic E. coli  N Normal 
ETEC Enterotoxigenic E. coli  NDIR Non-dispersive infrared  
ETV Environmental Technology 
Verification 
 NIST National Institute of 
Standards and Technology 
g Gram  NOM Natural organic matter 
GC-MS Gas chromatography-mass 
spectrometry 
 NTU Nephelometric turbidity 
units  
GLS Gas-liquid separator   NYCDEP New York City Department 
of Environmental Protection 
gpm Gallons per minute   
N 
 
Normal 
HFS Fluorosilicic Acid  NDIR Non-dispersive infrared  
hr Hour  NIST National Institute of 
Standards and Technology 
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NOM Natural organic matter  TIC Total inorganic carbon 
NTU Nephelometric turbidity 
units  
 TOC  Total Organic Carbon 
NYCDEP New York City 
Department of 
Environmental Protection  
 USACEHR US Army Center for 
Environmental Health 
Research  
ORP Oxygen reducing potential   USEPA United State Environmental 
Protection Agency 
PCR Polymerase Chain 
Reaction 
 UV Ultra violet 
ppb  Part per billion  VOC Volitile organic compounds 
ppm Part-per-million  WCIT Water Contamination 
Information Tool 
ppt Part per trillion  μ Micron 
PWSA Pittsburgh Water and 
Sewer Authority 
 μg Micrograms 
   μS/cm Microsiemens per 
centimeter  
     
     
 
